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1987 1.  I NTRODUCTI ON 
The  environment  is  being  increasingly  thought  of  as  an 
economic  resource  not  a  dispensable  luxury.  Environmental 
impact  assessment  (EIA)  is  widely  acknowledged  as  being  a 
basic  tool  for  the  assessment  of  the  environmental 
implicjtions  of  development  proposals'.  EIA  may  also  reduce 
management  costs,  and  the  time  taken  to  reach  a  decision,  if 
implemented  at  an  early  stage  in  project  planning.  The 
environment  is  now  firmly  on  the  political  agenda  in  both 
develuped  and  developing  countries  and  there  is  a  growing 
realization  that  procedures,  methods  and  techniques  to 
assess  the  environmental  impacts  of  projects  and 
developments  must  be  given  the  same  emphasis  that  economic 
and  technical  assessments  have  received  in  the  past 2 . 
There  is  to  date  universally  accepted 
definition  of  EIA. 
include: 
no  general 
Dofini tions 
and 
which  have  been  proposed 
"  an  activity  designed  to identify  and  predict  the 
impact  on  human  health  and  well  being,  of  legislative 
proposals,  policies,  programmes  and  operational 
procedures,  and  to  interpret  and  communicate  information 
about  the  impacts. ul 
to  identify,  predict  and  to  describe  in appropriate 
terms  the  pros  and  cons  (penalties  and  benefits)  of  a 
proposed 
to  be 
development.  To  be  useful,  the  assessment  needs 
communicated  in  terms  understandable  by  the 
community  and  decision  makers  and  the  pros  and  cons 
should  be  identified on  the  basis of  cri  tel'ia  relevant  to 
the  countries  affected. ,,4 
"  an  assessment  of  all  relevant  environmental  and 
resulting  social  effects  which  Mould  result  from  a 
project  . .,5 
.....  assessment  consists  in  establishing  quantitative 
values  for  selected  parameters  Hhich  indicate  the  quality 
of  the  environment  before,  during  and  aftel~  the  action,,6. 
Just  as  the  definitions  of  EIA  vary  so  also  does  the 
practice  of  EIA  in different  countries.  However,  in  general 
terms  EIA  seeks  to  aid  the  efficient  use  of  human  and 
natural  resources  and  has  proved  useful  to  both  those 
promoting  and  authorizing  developments.  If  potential 
-1 -problems  are  identified  early  in  project  planning 
considerable  financial  savings  may  be  achieved.  Design 
modifications  produced  as  a  result  of  ErA  findings  may 
increase  capital  costs  but  it can  be  argued  that  savings  to 
local,  regional  and  national  economies  arising  from  the 
avoidance  of  deleterious  impacts  and  from  the  maximisation 
of  beneficial  impacts  will  outweigh  the  costs  in  the  long 
term.  The  cost  of  ErA  may  even  decline  once  greater 
information  about  the  social  and  natural  environment  is 
available'. 
SCM  Chemicals  Ltd,  formerly  Laporte  Australia  Ltd,  have  been 
manufacturing  titanium dioxide  from  mineral  sands  in  Western 
Australia  since  1964.  The  plant  is  located  on  a  site at 
Australind,  approximately  5  km  northeast  of  Bunbury  in 
proximity  to  the  eastern shore  of  Leschenault  Inlet.  Since 
its early  days,  the  plant  has  been  a  major  source  of 
pollution  and  environmental  degradation  due  mainly  to  the 
disposal  of  the  factory's  liquid effluent  stream.  After. many 
years  of  investigations  and  experimentation  into alternative 
methods  of  waste  disposal,  a  decision  was  reached  in  July 
1987  to  relocate  the  plant  to  a  site  at  Kemerton, 
approximately  14  km  north  of  the  Australind  site.  The  new 
plant  will  have  a  greatly increased  production  capacity  and 
use  a  different  production  process.  The  result  will  be  the 
conversion  of  an  environmentally  undesirable  industrial 
operation  into  one  which  is acceptable  from  an  environmental 
viewpoint. 
This  development  has  been  the  product  of  a  series  of  studies 
and  investigations.  Several  committees  have  been  created 
since  the  early days  of  the  plant's  operations  explicitly to 
seek alternative  effluent  disposal  methods.  These  committees 
have  all  been  engaged  in environmental  impact  assessment  of 
various  levels.  The  Company  and  various  Government 
departments  have  also  contributed  to  this  process.  The 
latter includes  the  Public  Works  Department  which  has  been 
responsible  for  effluent  disposal  from  the  plant.  The 
Environmental  Protection  Authority,  which  became  involved  in 
1974,  has  been  a  key  player  in  the  ErA  process  since  then 
and  will  continue  to  be  so  in  the  future. 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  demonstrate  how  EIA  can  be 
an  ongoing  process  and  to  describe  the  changes  that  have 
been  introduced  into  SCM's  titanium dioxide  manufacturing 
plant  as  a  result  of  the  ErA  process.  ErA  procedures  have 
been  seen  to.have  benefited all  parties  concerned.  The  move 
-2-to  Kemerton  of  the  enlarged  titanium  dioxide  manufacturing 
plant  wjll  be  of  benefit  to  the  natural  environment,  the 
Company,  the  local  community  and  the  state. 
-3-2.  HISTORY  OF  THE  SCM  TITANIUM  DIOXIDE  PLANT  TO  1985 
Titanium  dioxide  is  used  worldwide  as  a  white  pigment  for 
paint,  rubber  and  plastics'.  Growth  in its  production  was 
dramatic  in  the  1950s  and  60s  when  it  was  displacing  the 
more  toxic  lead  oxides.  Titanium  dioxide  is  manufactured 
from  ilmenite  and  rutilelo ,  both  of  which  are  found  in  the 
southwest  of  Western  Australia. 
In  1956  the  State  Government  and  Laporte  Austral ia  Ltd,  a 
subsidiary of  the  British firm  Laporte  Industries  Ltd,  began 
negotiations  to  establish  a  titanium  dioxide  plant  in 
Western  Australia.  From  the  outset  the  major  issue  was  that 
of  effluent  disposal.  Information  was  obtained  from  the 
Lincoln  County  Council  in  the  Unit~d  Kingdom  (UK)  about 
effluent  discharge  from  the  Compan~ s  Grimsby  Plant  on  the 
Humber  Estuary  and  from  the  factory  of  another  company's 
plant  in  Tasmania.  The  State  agreed  in  1956  to  accept  full 
responsibility  for  the  disposal  of  liquid  wastes  should 
Laporte  establish at  Bunbury.  Negotiations  lapsed  in  1957 
when  the  Australian  market  was  considered  inadequate  but  the 
State  Government  continued  its evaluation  of  the  industry, 
particularly  with  regard  to  effluent  disposal,  and  arranged 
visits  to  both  the  UK  and  Tasmanian  installations. 
Negotiations  were  re-opened  in  1960  leading  to  the  Agreement 
Ac t  of  1961". 
Under  the  Laporte  Industrial. Fa~tory Agreement  Act  of  1961 
the  Company  was  to  construct  and  establish  a  factory  by  1965 
capable  of  produci ng  10,000  tonnes  per  annum  (tpa)  of 
titanium dioxide.  The  plant  was  to  be  sited  at  Australind 
and  use  the  sulphate  process.  The  State  agreed  to  supply  the 
Company  with  up  to  2,000,000  gallons  (9,000  kL)  of  water  per 
day  to  be  obtained  from  bores.  The  State  also  assumed  total 
responsibility  for  the  disposal  of  all  effluent  including 
cooling  water  from  the  Company's  works,  proposing  to  provide 
and  lay  an  18  inch  (45  cm)  diameter  pipeline  from  the 
discharge  outlets  of  the  Company's  pumps  across  the 
Leschenault  Inlet  and  Peninsula  to  a  discharge  pOint  in  the 
ocean  (see  Figure  1).  The  length  of  the  pipeline  could  not 
exceed  3~  miles  (5.6  km)  without  the  Company's  consent  and 
the  Company  would  pay  the  State  J/.  of  the  total  cost 
incurred.  The  term  of  the  agreement  was  50  yearsl2. 
The  plant  was  officially  opened  in  November 
production  commenced  in  January  1964  at  a  capacity 
tpalJ  .  The  capacity of  the  plant  was  subsequently 
in  1966  to  12,000  tpa  and  to  18,000  tpa  in 1969". 
-4-
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FigurE'  1.  Location  Map 
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-:....--~. The  daily  effluent  discharge  was  approximately  6,700  kL  of 
liquid  waste  containing  mainly  iron (ferrous)  sulphate  and 
sulphuric  acid.  It  was  discharged  into  the  surf  zone  in  the 
Indian  Ocean  on  the  western  side  of  the  Leschenault 
Peninsula.  This  method  of  effluent  disposal  was  based  on 
practises  at  the  Humber  Estuary  plant  in  the  UK  where  the 
tidal  range  is  over  7  m  with  a  maximum  tidaJ  flow  at  the 
point  of  discharge  of  70,000  kL".  However,  at  Australind, 
the  nearshore  areas  are  characterised  by  low  ocean  current 
speeds  and  also  by  white  sandy  beaches  and  sea  bed,  and 
clear  water  for  a  large  part  of  the  year. 
A relief  lagoon  was  used  during  days  on  which  northwest 
winds  occurred  with  the  effluent  discharged  into  the  ocean 
from  an  outlet  at  the  north  end  of  the.  lagoon  when  winds 
changed  to  southerlies.  Early in  1967  the  Binningup  Progress 
Association  became  concerned  about  the  effect  of  the 
effluent  on  marine  life.  However,  it  was  not  until  the 
summer  of  1967/68  that  serious  complaints  occurred.  The  floc 
of  ferric  hydroxide  formed  by  the  effluent  reacting  with 
seawater  had  moved  north staining  the  water  and  beach  sands 
at  Binningup  Beach".  On  5th  May,  1968  effluent  discoloured 
water  was  sighted  in  the  Leschenault  Inlet.  The  stain  had 
entered  the  Inlet  under  the  influence  of  north-north 
westerly  winds'7.  The  Public  Horks  Department  (PHD) 
confirmed  the  extent  of  discolouration;  recording 
concentrations  of  iron  as  high  as  2,000  mg/L  just  above  the 
ocean  bed  within  300  m  of  the  outfall.  A  decision  was 
announced  in  November  1968  that  no  further  effluent  would  be 
discharged  directly into  the  ocean.  Lagoon  disposal  on  the 
dunes  of  the  Leschenault  Peninsula  was  then  adopted; 
beginning  with  all  waste  being  deposited  into  the  relief 
lagoon'·. 
The  relief  lagoon  only  offered  a  temporary solution  to  the 
disposal  problem  and  the  use  of  this  area  ceased  in  June 
1969.  Effluent  was  then  discharged  into  a  lagoon  on  top  of  a 
bare  sand  dune  which  acted  as  a  settling pond  with  effluent 
overflowing  into  a  second  natural  depression.  From  there 
diesel  pumps  supplied  a  perforated  pipeline  laid  on  top  of 
the  bare  sand  ridges  surrounding  the  lagoon;  the  purpose  of 
this  being  to  provide  as  much  contact  time  as  possible  with 
the  calcerous  sands.  The  scheme  was  monitored  by  bores.  The 
use  or  the  settling  pond  and  the  perforated  pipeline  ceased 
in  September  1969.  In  August  1970  the  PHD  sought  advice  as 
to  the  feasibility  of  disposing  of  part  of  the  effluent  by 
directly injecting it  down  specially constructed  deep  bores. 
In  December  1970  a  decision  was  made  to  develop  a  new 
-6-disposal  area  to  the  north  of  the  existing sysFem'·.  To 
undertake  this  dune  disposal  it  was  necessary  for  the  state 
to  increase  the  length  of  the  pipeline.  The  Company  viewed 
its  obligations  as  being  restricted  to  the  pipeline 
specified  in  the  Agreement  Act  but  nevertheless  contributed 
the  3/ 8  of  capital  costs  to  all  extensions  of  the 
pipeline". 
The  most  successful  means  found  for  the  disposal  of  effluent 
into  the  dunes  has  been  the  use  of  lagoons  as  infiltration 
ponds.  When  effluent  disposal  into  a  lagoon  commences  there 
is  a  rise  in  the  water  table  resulting in  the  creation  of  a 
groundwater  mound  in  the  Safety  Bay  Sands  aquifer.  The 
effluent  usually sinks  to  the  bottom  of  the  aquifer  and  then 
moves  away  in  response  to  the  hydraulic  gradient  and 
gravity.  While  moving  through  the  aquifer,  the  effluent 
reacts  with  calcium  carbonate  forming  gypsum,  iron 
precipitate  and  carbon  dioxide.  The  neutralised  solution 
remaining  contains  iron  and  continues  to  move  in  response  to 
the  hydraulic  gradient  until it  discharges  into  the  ocean 
causing  some  staining.  Sometimes  effluent  is  able  to  migrate 
down  to  the  Tamala  Limestone  aquifer  where  similar  reactions 
take  place.  As  the  calcium carbonate  in  the  vicinity of  each 
lagoon  is  exhausted  the  amount  of  unneutralized  effluent  in 
the  system  grows.  The  use  of  a  lagoon  is  usually 
discontinued  when  excessive  ocean  staining  occurs,  adverse 
effects  on  vegetation  are  detected  or  staining  of  the  Inlet 
is  observed  or  predicted". 
A  proposal  was 
factory  output 
received  in  1974  from  Laporte  to  double 
to  36,000  tpa  of  titanium dioxide. 
the 
This 
increased  the  need  to  find  a  satisfactory effluent 
solution. 
The  Laporte 
effluent  from 
Industrial  Factory  Agreement  provided 
the  Bunbury  plant  shall  not  differ  in 
disposal 
that  the 
material 
respects  from  the  1961  discharge  from  the  Company's  factory 
at  Grimsby  in  the  .UK.  Thus,  the  proposed  doubling  of  the 
Bunbury  plant  output  would  double  the  volume  of  effluent 
produced  and  the  volume  of  water  supply  required. 
Negotiations  with  the  Company  resulted  in  agreement  to 
operate  with  the  same  quantity  of  water  thereby  increasing 
the  concentration  of  the  effluent.  Laporte  agreed  to  make  an 
annual  payment  to  the  State  of  $35,000  in  consideration  of 
savings  to  the  Company  in  not  having  to  construct  a  second 
Pipeline". 
-7-Direct  discharge  of  raw  effluent  into  the  Inlet  has  resulted 
from  breakages  in  the  main  pipeline  crossing  the  Inlet  and 
the  dunes.  There  are  50  recorded  instances  of  such  spills  in 
the  10  years  preceding  1985.  The  more  severe  spills  have 
resulted  in fish kills  and  destruction  of  the  benthic  biota 
in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  discharge.  Studies 
initiated  by  the  PWD  have  indicated  that  the  effects  on 
benthic  biota,  fish  and  crabs  are  short  lived". 
In  1983  it  was  recognized  that  more  disposal  lagoons  and 
hence  more  land  on  the  Peninsula  would  be  needed.  Cabinet 
made  funds  available  to  purchase  additional  land;  100  ha  of 
which  was  to  be  used  for  waste  disposal  in  the  short  term". 
In  September  1984  SCM  Chemicals  Ltd  purchased  the  titanium 
dioxide  plant  from  Laporte". 
In  November  1984  a  kilometre  long  red  stain 
in  the  Leschenault  Inlet  opposite  the 
was  discovered 
plant  and  it  was 
revealed  that  contaminated  groundwater  had  been  seeping into 
the  Inlet  for  at  least  four  years.  A drilling survey  on  the 
Australind  site  found  groundwater  contamination  to  be  far 
more  serious  and  widespread  than  expected.  The  Company  had 
sunk  six  bores  several  years  earlier  but  contamination  was 
finding its  way  past  the  bores  and  into  the  Inlet.  However, 
there  was  no  evidence  to  indicate  leaching  of  pollutants 
into  the  Collie  River.  Three  major  sites  under  the  plant 
were  identified  as  being  polluted;  under  the  main  plant, 
under  the  old  sulphur  dump  near  the  main  plant  and  under  the 
old  tip at  the  rear  of  the  site  near  the  Collie  River'·. 
In  May,  1985,  SCM  Chemicals  released  the  Summary  of  a  report 
entitled  "Groundwater  Contamination  Study",  but  the  report 
itself  was  not  made  available  for  public  scrutiny.  The 
Summary  identified  a  total  area  of  55  ha  which  was 
contaminated.  Under  the  main  plant  about  22.7  ha  of 
contaminated  groundwater  accounted  for  the  equivalent  of 
1740  tonnes  of  concentrated  sulphuric  acid.  The  contaminated 
groundwater  was  trapped  on  an  impervious  layer  of  clay 
ranging  from  6  to  30  metres  below  the  surface.  Six  domestic 
bores  to  the  north  of  the  plant  site  which  were  contaminated 
were  replaced  by  the  company.  The  Summary  clearly  stated 
that  groundwater  contamination  w~s strictly confined  to  the 
shallow sands  under  the  plant  site  and  had  not  extended  into 
the  Leederville  aquifer  formation  which  is  a  domestic 
groundwater  source.  It  was  revealed  that  83  explorato~y 
bores  had  been  drilled  to  trace  pollution  and  the  first 
de-watering  bores  were  in  operation  by  the  end  of  June  1985. 
-8-Under  the  main  process  factory site  250  kL/day  is  extracted 
and  included  with  the  process  water,  outside  the  factory 
site  north  of  the  main  processing  area  about  750  kL/day  is 
discharged  to  the  Peninsula  pipeline  and  at  the  waste  dump, 
300  kL/day  is  chemically treated  then  infiltrated into  the 
ground". 
3.  EARLY  REVIEWS  OF  THE  LAPORTE  INDUSTRY 
The  Laporte  Effluent  Disposal  Committee  was  formed  in  1970 
with  representation  from  the  PWD,  Laporte  Australia  Ltd, 
Government  Chemical  Laboratories  and  the  Coordinator  of 
Development.  The  broad  terms  of  reference  of  the  Committee 
were  to  investigate  alternative  methods  of  disposal  of  the 
Laporte  effluent  including  pipeline  and  dump  barges,  marine 
pipeline,  injection  wells  into saline  aquifers  and  chemical 
treatment  for  removal  of  iron'·. 
In  the  first  of  these  options  a  pipeline  would  convey  the 
effluent  to  a  holding  sump  at  Sunbury  Harbour  where  it  would 
be  transferred  to  barges  and  dumped  beyond  the  edge  of  the 
continental  shelf  approximately  90  km  offshore.  The  strong 
effluent  containing  100%  of  the  iron  and  98%  of  the  acid 
would  be  disposed  of  in  this  way  and  the  remaining  weak 
effluent  would  be  discharged  on  the  Peninsula.  The  major 
disadvantages  of  this  option  were  environmental  problems 
associated  with  deep  sea  fish  on  the  edge  of  the  continental 
shelf,  cost,  interruption  posed  by  inclement  weather  and 
possible  industrial  disputes,  and  pipeline  hazard  since  the 
pipe  from  the  Australind  site  to  the  harbour  would  pass 
through  wildlife  and  tourist  areas". 
A  survey  undertaken  for  a  possible  marine  pipeline  disposal 
system  indicated  that  ocean  disposal  would  have  to  be  at 
least  20  km  offshore  to  ensure  that  no  beach  staining 
occurred.  However,  the  cost  of  such  a  pipeline  and  its 
associated  operating  costs  were  considered  to  be  too  high'·. 
The  Geological  Survey carried  out  preliminary investigations 
of  bore  injection  of  effluent  into  deep  saline  aquifers.  At 
a  depth  of  1,800-2,100  m it  was  considered  that  injection 
would  affect  potable  water  supplies  at  600  m.  A  deeper 
stratum  at  4,500  m  contained  porous  sands  mixed  with 
calcerous  deposits  which  would  react  with  sulphuric  acid  to 
form  gypsum  and  consequently  block  the  injection  system. 
Such  an  option  could  not  be  considered  further  until  further 
investigations  were  carried out". 
-9-Chemical 
,'euse  of 
effective 
treatment  studies  concluded  that  the  recovery  and 
sulphuric  acid  provided  the  only  long  term 
and  aesthetically  acceptable  solution.  The 
preoxidation  of  ferrous  to  ferric  iron  would  largely prevent 
escape  of  iron  in  solution  from  the  dune  sands.  However,  the 
oxidation  process  was  extremely  slow  in  acid  solution.  It 
was  recommended  that  investigations  be  conducted  into  the 
nitrogen  dioxide  catalysed  oxidation  of  the  effluent". 
The  Laporte  Industrial  Factory  Agreement  Review  Committee 
was  founded  in  January  1974  to  consider  the  recommendations 
of  the  Laporte  Effluent  Disposal  Committee  and  to  review  any 
changes  necessary  to  the  Agreement  to  provide  for  disposal 
at  sea  and  to  facilitate  negotiations  with  the  Company 
concerning  cost  sharing responsibiliti.es",  In  February  1974 
the  matter  of  the  Laporte  effluent  was  referred  to  the 
Environmental  Protection  Authority  (EPA)  by  the  then 
Minister  for  Development  and  Decentralisation". 
Ocean  investigations  in  1974  using  self  recording  current 
meters  showed  that  wind  driven  currents  and  associated 
velocities  5-6  km  offshore  from  Bunbury  might  be  adequate  to 
disperse  effluent  discharged  in  that  20ne.  The  approach 
would  be  to  dispose  of  effluent  by  dispersion  and  dilution. 
In  view  of  these  factors  the  Review  Committee  recommended  to 
the  Government  that  a  decision  on  barging  be  deferred,  that 
the  Government  and  the  Company  jointly  finance  a  major 
investigation  programme  and  that  a  report  be  produced 
recommending  long  term  effluent  disposal  methods.  The 
approved  investigation  provided  for  the  study  of  all  options 
without  bias  and  was  originally scheduled  for  finalisation 
by  30th  June,  1976  but  the  completion  date  was  progressively 
postponed  as  further  studies  became  necessary". 
In  March  1975  the  EPA  indicated  a  preference  for  ocean 
disposal  of  the  plants  wastewater  beyond  the  continental 
shelf".  In  April  1975  the  PHD  installed  a  50  mm  diameter 
experimental  ocean  bed  pipeline  to  carry  5%  of  the  full 
production  flow  of  concentrated  effluent  to  a  discharge 
point  5.5  km  offRhore  in  16.5  m  water  depth' 7 "  The  EPA  felt 
that  the  pipeline  was  likely to  cause  problems  of  beach  and 
ocean  staining  by  effluent  and  accordingly set  two  broad 
criteria for  an  ocean  pipeline: 
•  No  significant  adverse  effect  on  marine  life;  and 
•  No  discolouration  of  water  or  beaches 
shore. 
-10-
visible  from  the The  EPA  also  set  up  an  ad  hoc  committee  to  advise  on  marine 
studies  for  an  ocean  pipeline' •. 
The  trial  pipeline  outlet  was  deliberately directed  onto  a 
colonised  area  of  the  sea  floor  where  damage  might  OCcur  and 
could  be  measured.  Experimentation  commenced  in  February 
1976  and  continued  until  April  1978  when  damage  caused  by 
Cyclone  Alby  lead  to  the  termination  of  the  trial.  It  was 
concluded  that  under  the  discharge  of  the  total  volume  of 
effluent  there  would  be  toxic  effects  over  200  ha  causing 
complete  denudation  and  a  further  area  of  about  1000  ha  in 
which  the  behaviour  of  fish  would  be  affected,  most  likely 
leading  to  their  exclusion". 
In  December  1976  the  EPA  provided  comment  on  criteria for 
the  existing  practice  of  dune  disposal  proposed  by  the 
Laporte  Industrial  Factory  Agreement  Review  Committee.  The 
EPA  considered  that  dune  disposal  should  also  meet  the 
criteria  specified  by  the  EPA  in  April  1975  for  ocean 
disposal".  The  EPA  considered  the  following  criteria 
acceptable: 
•  Produce  no  pollution of  aquifers  with  potential  to  meet 
Sunbury,  Eaton  and  Australind's  domestic  and  industrial 
water  supply; 
Produce  minimum 
fresh  water  soaks 
the  biology  of 
affected. 
changes  in  the  quality of  the  existing 
and  seeps  in  the  sand  dunes  so  that 
the  wildlife  dependent  on  them  is  not 
Produce 
effluent 
minimum  seepage  of 
to  the  Leschenault 
produce  no  staining or  seepage 
biology  of  the  ~stuary". 
diluted  and  neutralized 
Estuary  and  certainly 
which  would  affect  the 
In  August  1982  the  Laporte  Effluent  Disposal  Commi ttee' s 
report  entitled  "Laporte  Factory  Effluent  Disposal  - Report 
on  Disposal  Options"  was  forwarded  to  the  EPA  for 
consideration"2.  In  this  report  it  was  concluded  that  both 
chemical  treatment  and  barging  of  effluent  were 
prohibitively  expensive  and  did  not  in  themselves  provide  a 
total  solution.  A  range  of  options  were  identified  for 
effluent  disposal  but  no  single  option  was  clearly superior. 
The  report  considered  the  best  option  to  be  continued  dune 
disposal  in  conjunction  with  injection  and  marine  pipeline 
discharge.  This  would  involve  separation  of  the  effluent 
within  the  factory into  a  weak  and  strong  effluent  and 
-11 -disposal  individually  of  the  separated  streams.  The 
containing  'l5%  of  the  total  effluent  volume  but  only 
the  iron  and  no  suspended  solids  could  be  discharged 
stream 
5%  of 
to  the 
ocean  with  the  balance  of  the  effluent  being  discharged  into 
the  dunes  and  deeper  limestone  aquifer.  This  would 
necessitate  factory  modification  as  well  as  a  duplicate 
pipeline  across  the  estuary.  The  report  made  the  following 
additional  recommendations: 




additional  land  on  the  Leschenault  Penjnsula 
the  existing  disposal  area  be  secured 
immediately; 
•  Detailed  studies  be  undertaken  to  determine  the  works 
required  within  the  factory  and  beyond  to  enable  the 
effluent  to  be  handled  in  segregated  streams; 
•  field  tests  to  confirm  the  feasibility  of  long  term  bore 
injection  of  concentrated  effluent  into  the  limestone  be 
continued  and  accelerated; 
• 
That  investigations 
understanding  of  the 
be  undertaken 
mechanism  of  the 
floc  in  the  sea  water". 
to  gain  a  better 
visibility of  iron 
The  report  also  considered  changing  the  plant's  production 
method  to  the  chloride  process.  This  requires  rutile 
feedstock  which  is  a  higher  grade  titanium  dioxide  ore. 
However,  rutile  supplies  were 
compared  with  the  more  stable 
limited  and  the  price  high 
ilmenite  supply  and  the 
construction  of  a  chloride  plant  would  be  expensive.  It  was 
recommended  that  the  adaptation  of  the  chloride  method  to 
use  ilmenite  or  upgraded  ilmenite  be  examined". 
After  receiving  public  submissions  on  this  report  the  EPA 
responded  in  May  1983  in  a  bulletin entitled,  "Evaluation  of 
Disposal  Options  for  Effluent  from  Laporte  Titanium  Dioxide 
Manufacturing  Plant".  The  fundamental  outcome  of  this  was 
that  the  EPA  preferred  to  nominate  a  strategy for  future 
effluent  disposal  rather  than  a  particular  option.  A 
strategy can  be  more  flexible  being  composed  of  many  options 
or  elements.  In  choosing  a  preferred  strategy,  it  was 
considered  necessary  to  make  judgements  as  to  the  relative 
significance  of  environmental  impacts  of 
the  terreRtial,  marine  and  estuarine 
preferred  strategy  was  as  follows: 
-12-
various  options  on 
environments.  The •  Effluent  disposal  into  the  dunes  should  cease  as  Soon 
as  possible; 
•  Minimum  discharge  of  iron  through  an  ocean  pipeline 
greater  than  5.5  km  in  length; 
•  Separation  of  solids  and  copperas  from  the  effluent 
stream  for  landfill disposal;  and 
Production  and  regular 
management  programme 
rehabilitation  and  other 
impacts. 
review  of  an  environmental 
which  details  monitoring, 
means  for  ameliorating  adverse 
The  EPA  also  recommended  consideration  of  the  following: 
•  Codispersal  of  copperas  and  solids  with  flyash  from  the 
proposed  Bunbury  power  station and/or  with  red  mud  from 
alumina  production; 
A  programme  for  reduction  of  iron  loadings 
effluent; 
in  the 
•  Assessment  of  the  feasibility  of  disposal  of  liquid 
effluent  with  cooling  water  from  the  proposed  Bunbury 
power  station;  and  the 
•  Feasibility  of  acid  recovery  and  chemical  treatment  of 
strong effluent". 
The  EPA  acknowledged  that  the  preferred  strategy  would 
require  either  the  goodwill  of  the  Company  or  otherwise 
ammendments  to  the  1961  Agreement  Act.  The  benefi ts  of  the 
strategy  are  that  it  aimed  to  reduce  pollutant  loadings, 
ocean  discharge  would  be  possible  with  copperas  removal,  the 
Leschenault  Peninsula  could  be  made  available  for  more 
appropriate  uses  such  as  recreation,  the  risk  to  the  Inlet 
from  effluent  disposal  practices  would  be  minimal  and  very 
little  further  impact  on  the  ecology  of  the  Peninsula  would 
occur.  Finally, 
been  made  on  a 
sought  on 
assessment 46 . 
the  EPA  recommended  that  once  a  decision  had 
preferred  option,  the  EPA's  advice  should  be 
requirements  for  further  environmental 
4.  RECENT  ENVIRONMENTAL  IMPACT  ASSESSMENT 
The  environmental 
entered  a  new  phase 
assessment  of 
in  1984/85.  In 
Laporte/ SCM's  operati ons 
January  1984  a  joint submission  on  effluent  disposal  was  presented  to  Cabinet  by 
the  Minister  for  the  Environment,  the  Minister  for  Minerals 
and  Energy  and  the  Minister  for  Water  Resources' 7,  and  in 
September  SCM  Chemicals  Ltd  commenced  a  12  month  feasibility 
study  on  conversion  to  the  chloride  process's. 
While  this  was  occurring 
Environmentmental  Review  and 
the  EPA,  in  January  1985.  The 
Laporte/SCM  submitted  a  Stage  I 
Management  Programme  (ERMP)  to 
ERMP  was  subsequently  released 
This  action  was  endorsed  by  for  public  review  and  comment. 
Cabinet"  . 
The  purpose  of  the  ERMP  Stage  I  was  to  assess  the 
environmental  implications  of  the  various  long-term effluent 
disposal  strategies  based  on  current  knowledge  and  with 
consideration  given  to  various  social,  economic  and 
environmental  issues.  The  report  was  commissioned  by  the 
Laporte  Steering  Group  (LSG)  which  was  formed  in  1983  when 
Cabinet  terminated  all  of  the  other  Laporte  committees  and 
subcommittees'o. 
In  the  Stage  I  ERMP  it  was  stated  that  new  titanium  dioxide 
plants  constructed  during  recent  years  had  used  the  chloride 
rather  than  the  sulphate  process.  Company  personnel  advised 
that  it  would  be  technically possible  to  change  the  'front 
end'  of  Laporte's  factory  to  the  chloride  process .whilst 
maintaining  the  existing  product  treatment  facilities.  If  so 
the  volume  of  effluent  would  be  greatly  reduced  to 
1,000-1,800  tpa  ferric  chloride  and  air  emissions  of  sulphur 
dioxide/trioxide  would  be  largely eliminated.  However,  the 
capital  expenditure  on  a  change  to  chloride  technology  could 
not  be.  justified on  environmental  grounds  alone.  It  was 
proposed  that  a  substantiallY larger  plant  of  approximately 
50,000  tpa  titanium dioxide  was  required". 
In  the  ERMP  it  was  concluded  that  dune  disposal  of  effluent 
had  a  limited life  in  the  currently  available  areas.  An 
attractive  solution  would  be  Lo  change  to  the  chloride 
process  but  this  would  require  an  increase  in  plant 
capacity.  If  it  was  not  feasible  to  make  this  change,  then 
ocean  disposal  was  considered  the  only  practical  alternative 
for  the  weak  effluent.  Co-disposal  with  alumina  refinery  red 
mud 
for 
was  considered  the  most  favourable  long  term 
strong  effluent  and  deep  well  injection  was  a 
alternati ve' 2. 
trea  t ment 
potential 
It  was  that  the  commitment  by  the  State  to 
accept  responsibility  for  Laporte's  effluent  disposal  was 
-14-made  in  good  faith  when  long  term  environmental  implications 
of  disposal  were  not  fully  understood,  environmental 
protection  was  of  little concern  to  the  community  and  when 
the  comparable  Laport  plant  at  Stallingsborough  in  the  UK 
was  satisfactorily,  discharging  its  effluent  in  an 
apparently  similar  manner,  but  was  in  retrospect,  under 
greatly different  circumstances.  On  this  basis  a  case  could 
be  made  for  the  Company  to  acbept  more  responsibility £or 
future  waste  disposal'J. 
It  was  also  stated  that  the 
particularly  the  woodlands 
vegetation  of  the  Peninsula, 
to  the  north,  are  of  high 
conservation  value 





northern  expansion  of 
these  areas  and  conflict 
with  conservation,  tourism  and  recreation  values.  It  was 
felt  that  increasing  population  of  the  Greater  Bunbury 
Region  will  mean  that  the  Inlet  and  Peninsula  will  increase 
in  significance  as  a  scenic  and  recreational  resource  to  the 
local  and  visiting population". 
In  1985  a  report  on  environmental 
dune  disposal  to  1987-88  was 
submitted  to  the  EPA  for  comment. 
management 
completed 
proposals  for 
by  the  PWD  and 
The  EPA  responded  to  the  Minister  for  Minerals  and  Energy 
on  the  ERMP  Stage  I  in late 1985".  The  EPA  did  not  issue  an 
assessment  report  but  provided  some  guidelines  and  comments. 
In  this  guidance  the  EPA  stated  that it  strongly  supported 
the  Cabinet  commitment  to  eliminate  the  present  dune 
disposal  of  effluent.  The  EPA  also stated that  in  principle, 
it supports  the  manufacture  of  titanium  dioxide  pigment, 
providing it does  not  produce  any  waste  disposal  problems'·. 
At  the  same  time  as  the  above  process  was  occurring  the 
Leschenault/Kemerton  Regional  Park  concept  was  presented  in 
draft  form  for  public  comment.  This  concept  had  the  aim  o£ 
producing  a  land  use  plan  for  the  Leschenault  Peninsula  (and 
Kemerton)  which  accommodated  Government  commitments  and 
maximised  benefits  to  the  State  and  local  communities.  The 
draft  report  was  published  by  the  South  West  Development 
Authority.  The  terms  of  reference  of  the  report  were  as 
follows: 
-15-"To  identify  opportunities  for  development  of  the 
Leschenault  Peninsula/Kerner-ton  area  to  accommodate 
tourism,  recreation,  conservation  and  rehabi!i tatton, 
giving  due  recognition  to  the  short  term  requirements  for 
effluent  disposal  and  to  the  potential  for  the future 
siting of  a  smelter.  To  reflect  in  development  plans  the 
opportunities  and  constraints  of  the  land  and  the 
Leschenault  Inlet  and  to  maximise  potential  benefits  to 
the  State  and  local  people.  To  facilitate  public 
involvement  through  a  one  month  public  revieH  period  and 
through  a  seminar,  public  meetings  and  conSUltation  with 
the  local  community  and  other  interested  parties  during 
the  period  of  plan  preparation  and  review  ... '7. 
In  May  1986  SCM  Chemicals  Ltd  submitted 
to  the  EPA  in  which  it  was  proposed  to 
chloride  based  titanium  dioxide  plant. 
that  an  ERMP  be  prepared  (the  ERMP  Stage 
a  Notice  of  Intent 
construct  a  new 
The  EPA  requested 
II).  This  report 
was  released  for  public  review  in  November  1986'8. 
The  Stage  II  ERMP  proposal  involved  the  following: 
•  Construction  of  a  titanium dioxide  manufacturing  plant 
based  upon  the  chloride  process; 
•  Construction  of  a  chlor-alkali  plant  of  12,000  tpa 
capacity  to  provide  the  chlorine  required; 
•  Construction  of  an  air  separation  plant  to  supply  oxygen 
tpa  of  and  nitrogen  to  process  at  a  capacity of  44,000 
oxyge n; 
•  Decommissioning  of  the  existing sulphate  process; 
•  Conti nued 
Australi nd; 
use  of  the  existing  finishing  plant  at 
•  Use  of  rutile  or  synthetic  rutile  as  the  raw  material; 




of  small  quantitites  of  used  chlorinator 
are  mildly 
•  Disposal  of 
burial;  and 
•  Disposal  of 
and  process 
by  burial  at 
60  tonnes 
4,500 
components 
the  mineral 
per  day  of 
that 
sand  mines  at 
neutral  solid  by 
radioactive  brine  by 
kL/day  of  a  clear,  neutral,non-
infiltration at  the  plant site". 
-16-Construction  would  extend  over  a  two  year  period  with 
commissioning  scheduled  for  the  end  of  1988.  The  sulphate 
and  chloride  plants  would  operate  concurrently for  a  period 
of  one  year.  The  proponent  made  the  following  commitments  to 
environmental  management: 
•  Dust  and  noise  during  construction  would  be  controlled;. 
•  Noise  would  be  maintained  at  levels  that  would  not 
create  a  nuisance  to  surrounding  areas; 
•  The  plant 
landscaped; 
would  be  aesthetically  designed  and 
•  All  waste  products  would  be  safely disposed  of  and  all 
practicable  safety features  would  be  incorporated  into 
the  design; 
•  A  hazards  and  operability  study  (HAZOP)  would  be 
undertaken  for  the  plant  and  all  personnel  would  be 
trained  in  safe  work  practices  and  emergency 
procedures'·. 
The  capital  cost  of  conversion  would  be  $70  m  for  a  plant 
with  a  capacity of  over  50,000  tpa  titanium dioxide.  storage 
of  chlorine  would  be  in  2  refrigerated  tanks  of  25  tonnes 
capacity  maintained  at  -34°C  with  a  further  tank  as  a 
standby.  The  chloride  process  plant  would  require  2,520  kL 
of  water  per  day  to  be  extracted  from  deep  bores  with  an 
additional  480  kL/day  supplied  to  ancillary processes. 
Liquid  wastes  from  the  project  would  be  2,520  kL  of  process 
water  per  day  containing  chlorides  of  iron,  manganese, 
vanadium  and  unreacted  ore,  unreacted  coke  and  sodium salts; 
2,220  kL/day  of  groundwater  from  the  contaminant  recovery 
programme  (extracting  and  treating polluted  groundwater  from 
beneath  the  works  site)  and  blow  down  and  cooling  waters;  60 
kL/day  of  acidic  and  alkaline  liquors  produced  during 
regeneration  of  ion  exchange  columns  in  the  brine 
purification section  of  the  chlor-alkali  plant  and  sulphuric 
acid  bled  from  the  chlorine  drying  tower  to  be  used 
elsewhere.  All  liquid  wastes  and  contaminated  groundwater 
would  be  collected  and  neutralized  by  lime  addition  which 
would  raise  the  alkalinity and  precipitate  most  dissolved 
salts  and  the  solution  would  then  be  re-neutralized.  The 
solids  would  be  separated  in  a  clarifier  which  would  produce 
two  wastewater  streams.  An  overflow  of  4,500  kL/day  of 
neutral  brine  at  a  temperature  of  35°C  which  would  be 
-17-discharged  by  gravity to  the  Collie  River  and  an  underflow 
of  300  kL/day  of  neutral  brine  containing  approximately  60 
tonnes  of  suspended  solids.  The  suspended  solids  would  be 
discharged  to  infiltration ponds,  dried  and  then  buried"'. 
The  chloride  process  would  release  34,000  tpa  of  carbon 
monoxide  and  carbon  dioxide  and  60,000  tpa  of  nitrogen.  Any 
other  gases  that  might  be  produced  in  the  event  of  a 
malfunction  would  be  scrubbed.  Any  gaseous  stream 
contaminated  by  chlorine  would  be  directed  to  a  caustic  soda 
scrubbing  tower.  Treated  discharge  from  this  tower  would 
contain  1-5  ppm  chlorine.  Hydrogen  gas  would  be  vented  if  no 
other  uses  were  found  and  discharged  to  the  atmosphere. 
Gaseous  emissions  from  the  air  separation  plant  would  be 
released  to  the  atmosphere"'. 
The  beneficial  impacts  foreseen  included: 
•  Cessation  of  waste  water  disposal  on  the  Peninsula; 
•  Cessation  in  time  of  beach  staining; 
•  No  further  pollution  of  the  Inlet  from  pipeline  failure; 
•  Ability  to  rehabilitate  and  stabilize  the  coastal 
environment;  and 




sui  phur 
The  trade-off  for  these  environmental  gains  would  be  the 
risk associated  with  the  use  of  chlorine.  Chloride  process 
plants  handle  sufficient  quantities  of  toxic  chlorine  and 
titanium tetrachloride  to  impose  some  risk outside  the  plant 
boundary  in  the  event  of  a  major  loss  of  containment.  The 
preliminary  assessment  of  this  risk  concluded  that  an 
individual  fatality  risk  of  1  in  a  million  per  year  (for 
chlorine  storage  of  50  tonnes  on  the  Australind  site) 
extends  slightly  into  the  Australind  residential  district 
and  3  houses  exist  in  the  zone  of  risk  between  1  and  10  in  a 
million.  A  risk assessment  study  was  completed  by  Cremer  and 
Warner  in  1986.  The  proponent  would  undertake  a  risk 
assessment  of  the  proposal  at  the  completion  of  the  final 
design  in  order  to  confirm  or  improve  upon  the  results 
presented  in  the  Cremer  and  Warner  study"'. 
In  December.  1986, 
SCM  Chemicals  Ltd 
the  State  implemented  an  agreement  with 
entitled  ·Pigment  Factory  (Australind) 
-18-Agreement  Act".  The  Act  terminated  the  1961  Agreement  and 
allowed  SCM  to  use  the  sulphate  plant  until  the  changeover 
date  which  was  set  for  the  31st  December  1989.  The  State 
would  remain  totally responsible  for  the  disposal  of  all  the 
sulphate  process  effluent  at  the  cost  of  the  Company.  The 
Company  would  maintain,  repair  and  renew  the  pipeline  and 
its support  structure  at its  own  expense  and  pay  to  the 
State  $100,000  each  financial  year  until  90  days  after  the 
changeover  date.  According  to  the  new  Agreement  Act,  the 
Company  would  be  bound  by  any  recommendations  of  the  EPA 
subject  to  Cabinet  approval  and  during  the  continuance  of 
the  Agreement  would  investigate  the  technical,  economic  and 
environmental  feasibility  of  converting  the  sulphate  plant 
to  the  processing  of  other  raw  materials.  In  consideration 
of  the  Company  agreeing  to  cancel  the  1961  Agreement  Act  and 
releasing  the  State's  obligation  to  fund  waste  disposal,  the 
State  would  pay  the  company  $8,500,000  by  the  changeover 
date"  . 
In  May  1987  the  EPA  released  its report  and  recommendations 
on  the  Stage  II  ERMP  in  a  bulletin  entitled  "Proposed 
Chloride  Process  Titanium  Dioxide  Plant  at  Australind".  In 
regard  to  the  history  of  the  sulphate  process  plant's 
operation,  the  EPA  concluded  that;  "from  an  environmental 
viewpoint  it  would  have  been  inappropriate  to  initially 
locate  the  plant  al  Australind.  However,  given  the  location, 
development  in  proximity  to  the  plant  is  unfortunate  from  an 
environmental  planning  perspective."  The  EPA  also  stated 
that  the  ongoing  environmental  management  of  the  existing 
plant  had  been  inadequate  and  did  not  provide  a  basis  for 
confidence  in  the  future.  Problems  have  been  exacerbated 
because  the  company  is  effectively outside  the  environmental 
laws  applying  to  other  industries  in  the  State.  After 
assessing  the  Stage  II  ERMP,  the  EPA  came  to  the  following 
additional  conclusions: 
•  The  Australind  site could  be  made  environmentally 
acceptable; 
•  That  additional  safeguards  were  required; 
That  if  the 
recommendations 
generated  would 
EPA; 
proponent's  safeguards 





be  low  enough  to  be  acceptable 
EPA's 
ri  sks 
to  the 
I' 
I That  with  appropriate  conditions,  wastewater  discharge 
acceptable  could  be  managed  in  an  environmentally 
manner;  and 
That  provided  the  EPA 
construction  and  management, 
satisfactory environmentally 
monitors  all  stages 
the  proposed  plant  could 
and  riskwise66 ; 
of 
be 
The  EPA  also  pointed  out  that  the  operations  of  the  sulphate 
plant  were  exempt  from  the  1971-1980  Environmental 
Protection  Act  and  remain 
Environmental  Protection 




exempt  from  the  provisions  of  the 
Act  of  1986  until  the  revised 
Company  and  the  State  is 
The  EPA  was  not  completely satisfied  with  the  proposal  but 
believed  it  could  be  made  acceptable  subject  to  their 
recommendations.  One  benefit  of  the  project  is  that  it  would 
have  to  comply  with  the  Environmental  Protection  Act  119861 
as  determined  by  the  Pigment  Factory  IAustralindl 
Agreement·· . 
The  EPA  made  a  series  of  observations  and  recommendations 
regarding  the  Stage II ERMP  which  are  summarised  below. 
The  EPA  recommended  using  the 
December  1989  even  with  the  slight 
existing  lagoons  until 
possibility  of  staining 
local  beaches,  rather  than  open  up  new  lagoons  in 
ertvironmentally sensitive  areas  to  the  north  of  the  existing 
lagoons.  The  unused  lagoons  were  oversaturated  and  have 
impacted  upon  the  surrounding  vegetation  in  places·'. 
The  EPA  recommended  that  a  condition  of  approval  be  that  the 
existing plant  should  not  operate  beyond  31st  December,  1989 
lor  at  an  extension  of  time  determined  under  section  8  of 
the  Pigment  Factory  I Australindl  Agreement  19861.  Complaints 
by  residents  living  near  the  existing sulphate  plant  had 
been  made  since  the  plant  commenced  operations  in  1964.  The 
complaints  included  reports  of  choking  gases  that  cause 
severe  irritation of  the  eyes,  nose,  throat  and  skin  and 
severe  corrosion  damage  to  property  and  motor  vehicles. 
These  complaints  were  considered  to  be  justified  by  Clean 
Air  officers  monitoring  the  plant  in  the  early 1970s  who 
found  evidence  of  severe  property  damage  by  sulphuric  acid 
mi s t  7  0  • 
-20-The  ERMP  stated  that  "the  proponent  would  explore  productive 
ways  of  utilizing  the  redundant  sulphate  equipment"".  The 
EPA  preferred  that  the  redundant  sulphate  process  equipment 
not  be  utilized  for  any  purpose  at  the  Australind site' 2 • 
The  EPA  acknowledged  and  accepted  the  Cremer  and  Warner  risk 
analysis  but  recommended  that  a  HAZOP  study  be  completed  and 
submitted  before  construction  commences  and  be  conducted  in 
a  manner  approved  by  the  EPA.  The  EPA  believed  that  the 
proposed  plant  could  be  operated  with  25  tonnes  of  chlorine 
storage  and  recommended  this  as  a  maximum  storage  amount. 
The  EPA  also  recommended  that  no  chlorine  from  the  site  be 
sold  and  that  no  transport  of  chlorine  to  and  from  the  site 
except  during  the  commissioning  stage  should  occur.  The  EPA 
investigated  the  safeguards  required  for  chlorine  storage 
and  recommended  installation  of  full  height  concrete 
bunding,  insulation  tiles  in the  bunds,  a  foam  suppression 
system  and  isolating  valves  on  the  main  storage  tanks.  The 
EPA  recommended  that  the  company  should  be  responsible  for 
the  environmental  performance  of  the  chlor-olkali  plant  even 
if  its  management  is  subcontracted  out.  The  EPA  also 
recommended  that  the  proponent's  emergency  plan  be 
integrated  wi th  the  state  Emergency  Services  (SES)  Bunbury 
Regional  Counter  Disaster  Plan,  that  risk  levels  should 
never  exceed  those  presented  in  the  ERMP  and  that  no 
resldential  area  occur  within  the  1  in  a  million  per  person 
per  year  risk  contour.  Almost  all  of  the  houses  in  the 
Australind  area  fall  outside  the  1  in  a  million  risk  contour 
for  the  proposed  plant.  Three  houses  occur  in  the  area  of 
risk  greater  than  1  in  a  million  but  less  than  lOin  a 
million  and  the  EPA  recommended  that  the  Government  enter 
into  discussion  with  the  owners  to  ensure  they  would  not  be 
unreasonably  disadvantaged  should  the  proposal  proceed". 
The  EPA  also  made  the  following  recommendations: 
•  That  the  existing  pipeline  across  the  Inlet  should  be 
maintained  for  possible  ocean  disposal  if the  monitoring 
results  of  wastewater  effluent  discharge  to  the  Collie 
River  are  not  to  the  EPA's  satisfaction; 
That  the  proponent  install  a 
chlor-alkali  plant  capable  of 
scrubbing  system 
absorbing  all  the 
produced  at  full  production  for  one  hour;  and 
on  the 
chlori  ne 
•  That  the  licence  fees  payable  by  the  proponent  should 
help  to  meet  the  costs  of  EPA  monitoring". 
-21-In  June  1987  an  amendment  to  the  Pigment  Factory 
(Australind)  Act  1986  was  released.  This  announced  a  change 
in  the  site  from  Australind  to  Kemerton  and  an  extension  of 
the  changeover  date  to  30th  June,  1990.  Plant  production  was 
increased  to  70,000  tpa  with  the  finishing  plant  remaining 
at  Australind.  In  consideration of  the  company  agreeing  to 
relocate  the  chloride  plant  to  Kemerton,  the  State  would  pay 
the  Company  $6,350,000  by  31 st  July,  1990.  The  State  would 
also  purchase  SCM's  land  at  Australind  at  the  closure  of  the 
sulphate  plant  for  $650,000  and  lease  back  areas  which  are 
still  needed  for  the  ongoing  operation". 
The 
for 
EPA  determined 
this  proposal 
that  the  degree  of  assessment  required 
should  be  at  the  Notice  of  Intent  (NOI) 
level  since  the  Australind  proposal  had  been  previously 
examined  in  detail  and  was  very  similar  to  the  new  proposal. 
Furthermore,  the  EPA  had  previously assessed  a  proposal  for 
an  aluminium  smelter  at  the  Kemerton  site  and  had  presented 
a  detailed  assessment  report'·. 
According  to  the  NOI,  discussions  with  the  State  removed  any 
economic  impediments 
as  an  alternative  site.' 
located  14  km  north  of 
against  the  consideration  of 
Kemerton  is  55  ha  in  area 
the  Australind site". 




of  a 
plant 
70,000  tpa  titanium 
at  Kemerton  based  upon  the 
Kemerton 
and  is 
dioxide 
chloride 
•  Construction  of  a  12,000  tpa  chlor-alkali  plant  at 
Kemerton  wilh  100  tonne  refrigerated  chlorine  storage  in 
three  50  tonne  tanks  (one  tank  would  be  on  standby); 
•  Construction  of  an  air separation  plant  at  Kemerton  to 
supply  42,000  tpa  of  oxygen  and  60,000  tpa  of  nitrogen; 
•  Approximate  doubling  of  the  existing finishing  plant  at 
Australind; 
•  Decommissioning 
at  Australind 
of  the  existing sulphate  process  plant 
which  would  be  investigated  for 
alternative  process  use  in  the  future; 
•  Continuation  of  the  existing  sulphuric  acid  plant  at 
Australi nd; 
-22-Disposal  of  4,800  kL/day  of 
(including  contaminated  groundwater) 
Collie  River; 
treated  wastewater 
at  30-32°C  into  the 
•  Disposal  of  2,700  kL/day  of  treated  saline  wastewater 
into  the  Wellesley  River  via  a  1.5  km  drain; 
•  Disposal  of  40  tonnes/day  of  material  to  be  removed  with 
30%  solids  for  burial  offsite  from  Australind; 
•  Disposal  of  226  tonnes/day of  material  to  be  removed 
from  Kemerton  with  30%  solids  for  burial  either  at  Capel 
or  at  an  area  east  of  the  Wellesley  River;  and 
•  Disposal  of  a  small  quantity  of  mildly  radioactive  waste 
from  Kemerton  by  burialoffsite7B . 
The  plant  would  be  provided  with  various  emergency  relief 
systems.  In  the  original  Australind  proposal  these  were  to 
involve  passing  relief  gas  streams  through  appropriate 
scrubbing  devices  before  release  to  the  atmosphere.  In  the 
NOI  proposal  it  was  planned  to  exhaust  such  emissions 
through  an  emergency  emission  control  without  a  scrubbing 
system  to  an  appropriate  height  release  stack.  The  original 
proposal  included  a  building  to  house  the  chlorination 
purification  and  storage  units  to  red~ce  the  risk  and 
nuisance  to  close  neighbours.  This  was  considered 
unnecessary  for  the  Kemerton  site especially given  that  it 
would  increase  the  safety risk  to  employees.  The  Company 
proposed  to  continue  using  the  sulphUric  acid  plant  at  the 
Australind  site  as  a  source  of  steam  for  the  finishing 
plant.  According  to  the  NOl,  use  of  the  redundant  sulphate 
plant  assets  formed  an  integral  part  of  the  plant  conversion 
economics  and  any  future  uses 
consi dered  7 •• 
for  this  plant  would  be 
The  EPA  was  advised  by  the  Minister  for  the  Environment  that 
its assessment  of  the  NOI  proposal  was  required  by  16th 
July,  1987.  The  EPA  then: 
•  Consulted  the  Harvey  Shire  Council  on  the  best  means  of 
obtaining  public  input; 
•  Provided  input  to  the  summary  of  the  company's  NOI  which 
the  Council  made  available  to all  surrounding  residents; 
•  Made  copies  of  the  NOI  available  at  local 
libraries  and  the  Council  chambers; 
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public •  Organised  a  public  meeting.  The  proceedings 
and  transcripts  used  as  submissions;  and 
were  taped 
•  Forwarded  copies  of  the  NOI  Lo  all  relevant  government 
agencies  for  comment. 
The  EPA  received  38  written  submissions  from  the  public  and 
Government  departments  in  addition  to  the  transcript  of  the 
public  meeting"·. 
The  EPA  concluded  that  the  development  of  a  chloride-process 
titanium  dioxide  plant  at  the  Kemerton  site  would  generate 
environmental  impacts  including:  construction  phase  impacts, 
impacts  of  risk  and  hazard,  other  environmental  impacts  due 
to  the  emission  of  wastes,  environmental  impacts  due  to 
water  resources  extraction  and  occupational  health  and 
traffic  impacts.  The  EPA  recommended  that  a  HAZOP  study  be 
completed  and  submitted  to  the  EPA  before  construction 
commences,  that  a  final  risk analysis  report  incorporating 
the  plant  design  after  the  HAZOP  study  be  submitted  soon 
after  construction,  that  a  hazard  analysis  be  submitted 
before  plant  commissioning  and  an  audit  of  risk  and  hazards 
be  submitted  to  the  EPA  upon  request"'. 
The  EPA  concurred  that  due  to  the  adequate  buffer  zone  of 
approximately  2  km  radius  at  the  Kemerton  site it  may  not  be 
necessary  to  have  all  of  the  safeguards  initially  proposed 
for  the  Australind  site.  However,  given  the  similarity of 
the  buffer  zone  distance  at  the  Kwinana  industrial  area,  an 
equivalent  degree  of  safeguards  should  be  required.  The  EPA 
decided  that  this  matter  could  best  be  resolved  at  the  HAZOP 
analysis  stage.  The  EPA  recommended,  as  for  the  Australind 
proposal,  that  there  be  no  sale  of  chlorine  from  the 
Kemerton  site  without  further  specific  EPA  assessment  and 
that  no  more  than  50  tonnes  of  chlorine  should  be  stored  at 
Kemerton  in  containers  not  exceeding  25  tonne  capacity. 
Subcontracting  the  chlor-alkali  plant  at  Kemerton  would  be 
acceptable  to  the  EPA  but  it  recommended  that  the  proponent 
be  held  responsible  for  environmental  performance.  The  EPA 
recommended  that  the  proponents  emergency  plan  be  integrated 
with  the  proposed  SES  Bunbury  Regional  Counter  Disaster 
Plana2 . 
The  EPA  concluded  that  the  proposal  to  discharge  wastewater 
into  the  Wellesley  River  was  unacceptable  and  recommended 
that  the  proponent  investigate  alternatives  such  as  ocean 
discharge 
that  a 
or  deep  well-injection. 
chlorine  scrubbing  system 
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It  was  also  recommended 
be  installed  on  the chlor-alkali  plant  with  sufficient  back  up  to  be  able  to 
absorb  all  of  the  chlorine  produced  during  one  hours 
production  and  that  the  company's  proposal  for  solid  waste 
management  and  disposal  be  submitted  for  EPA  assessment 
priol'  to  completion  of  construction  and  that  the  solid  waste 
disposal  sites  be  approved  by  the  appropriate  Government 
agencies,  including  the  Radiological  Council.', 
The  EPA  was  informed  by  the  Water  Authority  of  Western 
Australia  that  there  would  be  adequate  fresh  water  available 
for  the  proposed  plant  at  Kemerton;  however,  insufficient 
detail  had  been  provided  for  the  EPA  to  advise  on  water 
supply,  Consequently,  the  EPA  recommended  that  a  detailed 
water  supply  proposal  be  referred  to  the  EPA  for 
assessment84 . 
It  was  also  recommended  that  the  existing  sulphuric  acid 
plant  and  the  existing sulphate  process  plant  at  Australind 
should  not  operate  beyond  30th  June,  1990  and  that  until 
30th  December,  1987  the  sulphur  dioxide  emissions  should  not 
exceed  1000  ug/m'  averaged  hourly  and  from  1st  January,  1988 
those  emissions  should  not  exceed  1000  ug/mJ  at  any  time  in 
any  residential  area"', 
Finally,  the  EPA  again  recommended  that  the  proponent  be 
required  to  meet  the  reasonable  costs  associated  with 
monitoring  the  environmental  performance  of  the  construction 
and  operational  phases  of  the  Australind  and  Kemerton 
plants··, 
-25-5.  DISCUSSION 
The  history  of  the  SCM  titanium dioxide  plant  at  Australind 
is  a  good  example  of  EIA  as  an  ongoing  process  rather  than 
one  that  starts  with  a  proposal  and  ends  with  the  decision 
to  go  ahead.  EIA  should  not  be  limited  to  the  production  of 
a  PER  or  ERMP  compiled  at  one  point  in  time  and  which  serves 
as  a  tool  for  decision-making  purposes,  but  should  be  a 
continuing activity involving  the  entire  community. 
In  the  SCM  case  there  has  been  a  series  of  environmental 
impact  assessments,  some  of  which  involved  the  public.  The 
PWD  has  been  responsible  for  effluent  disposal  from  the 
sulphate  process  plant  at  Australind  and  has  sought 
alternatives  and  refinements  to  the  dune  disposal  method. 
The  Laporte  Effluent  Disposal  Committee,  formed  in  1970, 
investigated  alternative  methods  of  effluent  disposal 
including  pipeline  and  dump  barges,  marine  pipeline 
deep-well  injection  and  chemical  treatment.  The  Laporte 
Industrial  Factory  Agreement  Review  Committee,  founded  in 
1974,  was  formed  to  consider  the  recommendations  of  the 
Laporte  Effluent  Disposal  Committee  and  to  review  changes 
necessary  to  the  Agreement  Act  1961.  These  early reviews  can 
all  be  regarded  as  informal  environmental  impact  assessment. 
The  matter  of  Laporte's  effluent  was  referred  to  the  EPA  in 
1974;  the  Authority  indicated  preference  for  ocean  disposal 
of  the  plant's  wastewater  in  1975  and  set  two  broad  criteria 
for  an  ocean  pipeline.  The  EPA  also  set  up  an  ad  hoc 
committee  to  advise  on  marine  studies  for  an  ocean  pipeline 
and,  in  1976,  provided  comment  on  criteria for  acceptable 
dune  disposal.  In  1983  the  EPA  responded  to  the  report  of 
the  Laporte  Effluent  Disposal  Committee  and  nominated  a 
preferred strategy  for  effluent  disposal  rather  than  a 
particular  option.  This  strategy included  a  preference  to 
cease  dune  disposal  as  soon  as  possible.  The  stage  was  then 
set  for  a  more  formal  approach  to  EIA. 
Cabinet  terminated  all  of  the  Laporte  committees  in  1983  and 
established  the  Laporte  Steering  Group  (LSG)  which  had  the 
objective  of  terminating  waste  disposal  on  the  Leschenault 
Peninsula,  reviewing  disposal  options  and  implementing  the 
preferred  disposal  option.  The  LSG  was  also  to  investigate 
and  implement  rehabilitaiton  of  the  Peninsula  and  ensure 
that  effluent  disposal  would  conform  with  the  advice  of  the 
EPA.  The  Stage  I  ERMP  commissioned  by  the  LSG  was  submitted 
to  the  EPA  who  did  not  issue  an  assessment  report  on  the 
-26-stage  I  E~MP but  provided  some  guidelines  and  comments  to 
assist  with  further  studies. 
In  May  1986  SCM  (now  the  plants  owners)  submitted  a  Notice 
of  Intent  to  the  EPA  for  the  proposed  conversion  of  the 
Australind  plant  to  the  chloride  process.  The  EPA  requested 
that  an  ERMP  be  prepared.  This  lead  to  the  release  of  the 
Stage  II  ERMP  in  November  1986.  EPA  assessment  of  the 
proposal  took  into  consideration  51  submissions.  The  EPA 
indicated  a  preference  for  the  existing  and  proposed  plant 
to  be  relocated  elsewhere  but  concluded  that  the  Australind 
sit  could  be  made  environmentally  acceptable  subject  to 
strict control. 
In  December  1986  the  State  terminated  the  1961  Agreement  and 
implemented  a  new  agreement  with  SCM  (Pigment  Factory 
(Australind)  Agreement  Act).  This  Act  was  subsequently 
amended  in  1987  when  the  Kemerton  site  was  made  available  to 
the  Company. 
SCM  released its  NOI  for  a  70,000  tpa  chloride  process  plant 
at  the  Kemerton  site  in  June  1987.  The  NOI  was  made 
available  for  limited  public  review;  a  public  meeting  was 
also  held.  The  NOI  assessment  was  able  to  short  circuit  some 
of  the  EIA  procedures  since  the  Kemerton  proposal  was 
essentially the  same  as  the  previous  Australind  proposal  and 
the  Kemerton  site  had  previously  been  assessed  for  an 
aluminium  smelter.  Although  new  predictions  were  made,  a 
quick  evaluation  was  possible.  The  EPA  assessment  of  the 
Kemerton  proposal  will  lead  to  the  solution of  the  dune 
disposal  problem  on  the  Peninsula  and  the  eventual  cessation 
of  sulphurous  air  emissions  at  Australind.  The  ongoing 
environmental  impacts  of  effluent  disposal  and  air emissions 
will  be  replaced  by  an  acceptable  risk  impact  due  to 
chlorine  and  titanium tetrachloride  storage.  The  Kemerton 
proposal  requires  the  disposal  of  4,800  kL  of  liquid 
effluent  per  day,  including  1,800  kL  of  contaminated 
groundwater  from  the  Australind  site  and  2,700  kL  from  the 
Kemerton  site,  In  each  case  the  effluent  stream  will  be  a 
clear  brine.  The  Australind  site effluent  will  be  discharged 
into  the  Collie  River  and  the  Kemerton  site effluent  with 
the  existing  plant  which  generates  approximately  6,700  kL  of 
liquid  effluent  daily  (for  only  half  the  quantity  of 
titanium  dioxide  produced)  and  which  is  disposed  of  in  the 
dunes  on  the  Peninsula.  When  the  groundwater  contamination 
recovery  programme  is  ended,  and  if the  finishing  plant  is 




I' further  reduced  and  effluent  streams  could  be  recycled  and 
reused. 
Closure  of  the  existing sulphate  process  plant  will  end  the 
sulphur  dioxide  emissions  which  have  been  a  source  of 
complaint,  particularly from  residents  of  Australind.  The 
air  emissions  from  the  Kemerton  proposal  are  carbon  monoxide 
and  dioxide,  nitrogen  and  hydrogen. 
The  EIA  process  has  not  only  been  the  driving  force  behind 
this  solution  to  the  environmental  problems  associated  with 
the  sulphate  process  plant  but  has  assisted  in  other  ways. 
The  Company  will  benefit  by  its  move  to  Kemerton  by  ending 
its  dependence  upon  outmoded  and  non-competitive  technology 
and  by  doubling  its  production  output  ..  Furthermore,  the  new 
plant  will  have  probably  the  most  competitive  technology  and 
be  one  of  the  biggest  in  the  world.  The  Company  will  have 
fewer  planning  constraints  at  the  Kemerton  site  due  to  the 
presence  of  a  suitable  buffer  zone. 
The  local  community  will  benefit  in  a  number  of  ways.  The 
dunes  on  the  Peninsula  can  be  rehabilitated  when  disposal 
ceases  and  public  access  to  this  area  can  then  be  made 
available.  The  visually  obtrusive  pipeline  across  the 
Leschenault  Inlet  may  also  be  removed.  Termination  of  the 
sulphurous  emissions  will  benefit  the  local  residents  and 
part  of  the  Australind  site  can  be  rehabilitated  and  given  a 
more  appropriate  land  use.  These  gains  have  been  facilitated 
by  the  involvement  of  the  local  community  from  individuals 
up  to  the  Harvey  Shire  Council. 
The  State  will  also  derive  certain 
Kemerton  proposal.  There  will  no  longer 
benefits  from 
be  the  problem 
the 
and 
expense  associated  with  effluent  disposal  from  the  sulphate 
process  plant.  The  doubling  of  titanium dioxide  output  will 
increase  the  value  added  which  comes  to  WA  and  the  State 
will  benefit  by  hosting  one  of  the  biggest  and  most 
competitive  plants  in  the  world.  The  State  has  also 
demonstrated  that  it  can  take  advantage  of  market 
opportunities  and  do  so  very  quickly.  Furthermore,  the  State 
will  benefit  socially and  economically  by  improved  land  use 
in  the  Australind district. 
This  study clearly demonstrates  that  EIA  is  not  a  hindrance 
to  development.  The  EIA  process  has  served  as  a  driving 
force  behind  social  and  economic,  as  well  as  environmental 
benefits.  Compared  with  the  existing  and  proposed  plant  at 
-28-Australind  the  Kemerton  proposal  will  achieve  significant 
environmental  and  economic  advantages  by  facilitating  the 
environmentally  preferred alternative  with  a  larger  plant. 
The  sgcial  environment  will  also significantly benefit.  The 
new  plant  whilst  doubling  the  existing  output  of  titanium 
dioxide,  is  a  highly competitive  project  creating  virtually 
no  air  emissions,  using 
less  liquid  effluent 
constraints.  The  Kemerton 
environment,  the  local 
Company. 
water  more  efficiently,  producing 
and  imposing  fewer  planning 
project  will  be  of  benefit  to  the 
community,  the  state,  and  the 
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Australind  were  interviewed 
pa pe r, 
titanium 
to  try 
key  players  in  the 
dioxide  plant  at 
to  gain  a  better 
und~rstandjng of  the  process  of  ETA  in  HA  as  saen  by  those 
involved.  The  emphasis  has  been  on  how  ETA  works  in  HA  and 
in  particular  how 
Laporte/SCM  plant. 
it  has  worked  in  relation  to  the 
The  transcripts  of  these  interviews  are 
included  in 
Appendices 
perspecti ves 
the  following  pages  as  Appendices  to  4.  These 
have  been  included  to  present  the  various 
of  the  people  involved.  No  attempt  has  been 
made  to  analyse  or  discuss  these  perspectives, 
have  been  presented  for  the  reader's  interest. 
rather  they 
-40-APPENDIX  I 
Interview  with  Barry  Carbon, 
Protection Authority  on  17th 
Chairperson  of  The  Environmental 
August,  1987 
I  would  like  to start  talking  abaut  culture  and  interaction 
with  EIA  by  highlighting  the  fact  that  every  nation  has  a 
different  culture.  It  is  very  important  that  we  do  not  look 
Bt  the  literature  and  the  systems  other  people  use,  and  then 
decide  we  can  or  should  translocate  other  peoples' 
experience  to  ouru.  Similarly,  it is  also  important  for  us 
not  to  look  at  another  system  and  say  that  it  is  different 
from  ours,  therefore  it is  better  or  it is  worse.  It is  my 
estimation  that  most  places  have  a  system  that  is 
appropriate  to  their  culture,  and  that  there  is  a  range  of 
socio,  politico,  legal,  cum  cultural  reasons  Vlhy  we  have 
those  systems  and  most  of  us  have  systems  appropriate  to  us. 
There  are  some  classic  examples;  places  like  the  United 
States  or  Japan  where  society  has  come  to  have  expectations 
which  are  based  on  legal  systems  of  rules. 
The  model  that  we  have  just  been  discussing  uses  a  baSIS 
whereby  a  prescribed  set  of  measurements  are  taken  on  a 
prescribed  set  of  pollutants  or  emissions;  the  performance 
of  the  company  is  judged  on  the  basis  of  meeting  those  set 
of  standards  or  emissions  which  are  uniform  across  all 
compani es.  It 
manufacturing 
like  everybody 
really  does  not  matter  whether  you  are 
sulphur  dioxide  or  not;  you  may  be  prescribed 
else  to  take  measurements  of  it. 
The  Blternate  model  which  is  being  generated  and  evolved 
thro~gh Europe  is  based  on  the  best  something'  technology  -
best  practical,  best  economic  or  best  available.  Companies 
are  expected  to  set  certain  forms  of  control  depending  on 
what  sort  of  control  methods  are  available  at  the  time  that 
the  project  goes 
comp'an:y·,  II if  you  are 
we  expect  you  to  try, 
ahead.  Essentially  society  says  to  a 
trying  as  hard  as  you  can  or  as  hard  as 
then  you  are  acceptable". 
That  has  worked  in  many  instances  but  also  fails  at  "both 
ends".  Even  if  evel'yone  tries  hard  enough,  they  might  not  be 
effective  enough  in  terms  of  their  impact.  In  other  words 
their  cumulative  impact  or  even  their  individual  impact  may 
be  greater  than  the  assimilative  capacity  of  a  certain 
environment.  The  best  technology  may  not  be  good  enough  to 
protect  the  environment.  The  other  end  where  it  fails  i-
that  it  requires  people  to  try  as  hard  as  they  can,  and  they 
may  have  to  try  even  harder  each  time  there  is  available  a 
change  in  technology.  It also  requires  them  to  try  as  hard 
- 41  -as  they  can  even  if they  go  to  a  remote  location  despite 
where  "going  to  a  remote  location"  may  be  the  best  way  to 
protect  the  environment.  This  is  a  negative  incentive 
associated  with  site  location, 
often  the  most  critical 
environmental  impact. 
and  really site  location  is 
of  issues  associated  with 
So  we  have  different  models  that  are  available,  according  to 
the  culture  in  which  one  originates,  and  we  have  been  able 
to  see  in  the  history of  the  last  20  years  of  development  in 
Western  Australia  that  the  company's  that  have  come  to  here 
from  different  cultures,  often  expect  us  to fit  a  role  mode 
that  is  associated  with  the  culture  from  which  they  have 
come.  We  have  a  culture  here  which  is  based  on  the  very 
special  privilege  of  doing  assessmen~  on  each  of  the  major 
proposals  which  comes  to  us  and  asking  the  question  about 
each  of  those  "how  can  this  proposal  be  made 
environmentally  acceptable?  - Acceptable  in  the  term  that 
its  impacts  do  not  exceed  the  assimilative  capacity of  the 
particular  environment  in  which it is  located  ".  This  is  the 
objective  - to  try to  find  a  way  to  make  the  projects  fit 
the  assimilative  capacity  and  the  assimilative  capacity  may 
be  the  capacity of  either  the  natural  environment  or  the 
assimilative  capacity in  terms  of  the  impacts  on  its  people. 
The  Laporte  project  was  in  fact  discussed  at  the  very first 
meeting  of  the  EPA  in  WA  and  has  been,  I  would  suspect,  the 
most  frequent  "return  visitor"  to  EPA.  The  frequent  topics 
of  discussion  have  been  twofold.  Firstly discussion  on  the 
impacts  of  waste  disposal  from  the  sulphuric  process  but 
also  increasingly  the  difficulty  in  coping  with  the 
separation  between  industry  and  what  is  potenti~lly an 
attractive  living  environment.  As  people  have  moved  in 
closer  to  the  plant  we  have  had  problems  associated  with  air 
emIssions.  The  first  instance  was  impacts  on  the  towns  and 
that  went  through  an  environment  review  process  and  the 
company  was  asked  to  make  some  variation  to  its height  of 
emission  stacks. 
So  here  we  have  in  1987  a  time  when  the  company  finds  it 
attractive  to  be  expanding  because  it  has  large  markets  and 
a  time  When  it  is  economically  attractive  to  go  to  a 
different  technology  and  a  time  when  the  State  has  been 
reviewing  its  options  associated  with  long  term  disposal  of 
the  sulphuric  acid  residues  - disposal  in  terms  of  where 
does  one  go  to  because  the  Peninsula  will  be  filled  up 
within  about  3  to  4  years;  and  in  terms  of  the  dollar  cost 
associated  with  it  and 
cost. That  is  the  long 
in  terms  of  the  ongoing  environmental 
term  environmental  cost  associated 
-42-with  sterilising significant  parts  of  a  special  piece  of  the 
environment  along  the  coast. 
The  most  .-ecent  role  of  the  EIA,  I  suppose,  started  18 
months  ago  when  the  company  was  involved  with  agencies  of 
the  State  in  reviewing  the  options  available  in  waste 
disposal.  The  next  point  I  would  like  to  make  about  EIA  ln 
WA  is  that  it  does  not  belong  to  the  EPA  as  a  process,  very 
often  the  agents  associated  with it are  the  proponent  plus 
other  agencies  other  agencies  who  have  as  a  subsidiary, 
but  important  part  of  their  objective,  environmental 
objectives.  For  example,  the  Department  of  Mincs  in  the 
State  has  a  primary  objective  to  promote  mining  and 
exploitation  of  minerals  but  as  a  secondary  objeclive,  it 
has  the  objective  associated  with  restoration  of  qualities 
of  land  after  mining.  Rehabilitation,  if  you  like,  and  that 
is  now  seen  by  society  as  a  responsibility  part  of  the 
mining  industry, 
The  Department  of  Resources  Development,  Department  of 
Conservation  and  Land  Management,  Department  of  Min.s  and 
the  departments  associatad  with  Water  Resources  all  were 
involved  in  looking  at  alternatives  to  waHte  disposal  and 
put  together  a  Stage  1  ERMP.  The  Stage  1  ERMP  said  "there 
are  options  we  have"  and  they  went  right  through  from 
neutralisation  of  the  acid,  pumping  to  a  remote  location, 
disposal  in  the  ocean,  deep  disposal  by  deep  well  injection. 
All  of  those  were  canvassed,  their  financial  and 
environmental  consequences  were  looked  at,  put  out  for 
public  comment,  the  EPA  provided  a  preliminary  advice  to 
Cabinet  on  that  and  everyone  said,  "let's sit  back  for  six 
months  and  look  at  it".  The  environmental  objectives  had 
been  stated  by  the  EPA  but  not  the  means  by  which  those 
objectives  should  be  met.  It  then  went  through  a  process 
where  the  companies  had  examined  the  options  and  the  State 
and  they  had  financial  negoLationsat  a  preliminary  stage 
and  came  to  a  balance  which  said  the  thing  that  would  bo 
most  attractive  is  to  go  away  from  the  sulphate  technology 
to  chloride  technology.  This  reduces  quite  Significantly  the 
environmental  impact  in  terms  of  air  emiSSions,  quite 
significantly reduces  in  terms  of  waste  and  the  nature  of 
waste  which  needs  to  be  dealt  with  but  then  raised  quite 
different  elements  of  environmental  concern.  I  guess  that  it 
took  us  from  environmental  impact  which  is  an  ongoing  one  at 
a  low  level  assoclated  with  the  sulphuric  process  through  to 
an  environmental  impact  which  was  probably  very  small  from  a 
view  of  ongoing  impact  but  had  a  risk associated  with  that. 
What  if?  What  if something  goes  wrong?  and  does  that  cause 
an  excessive  risk?  So  we  went  through  the  process  of 
assessing  that  risk  and  found  that  although  it  would  be 
-43-possible  to  use 
process,  there 
the  existing  location  for  the  chloride 
would  need  to  be  extremely  tight  and 
stringent  requirements  placed  on  the  company  in  order  to 
make  it safe  enough.  It still is  an  option  that  it  might  end 
up  being  the  attractive  thing  to  the  company  - that  given  a 
very  tight  set cf  controls,  the  company  could  go  ahead  and 
bUIld  a  plant  of  a  restricted  size  and  a  restricted  impact 
on  its existing oite  using  the  chloride  process.  I  can  not 
remember  the  number  of  recommendations  the  EPA  made,  it  was 
quite  a  lafge  number  and  they  were  very  specific  and  much 
more  stringent  that  any  we  have  placed  on  any  proposal  we 
have  looked  at.  I  guess  the  feature  about  that  was  that  it 
was  possible  to  look  at  this  specific  project  and  that 
specific  location  and  say,  "In order  to  make  that  proposal 
meet  tho  assimilative  capacity  of  that  environment;  that  is 
both  the  naLural  environment  and  the  people;  what  is 
necessary  to  impose  on  it?".  Now  if  we  had  taken  the 
approach  of  the  best  practical  technology,  it  is  my 
assessment  that  the  best  practical  economic  technology  would 
have  said  to  you,  "In  doing  this,  you  are  going  to  end  up 
with  a  level  of  risk  which  is  higher  than  what  the  EPA  would 
find  acceptable?".  If  one  had  used  the  approach  that  says 
meet  x,  y  or  z  levels  of  emission  then  you  would  not  have 
had  a  mechanism  that  could  properly  take  into  account  the 
"what  if anything  goes  wrong"  approach.  This  enabled  a 
recipe  to  say  to  the  company,  and  to  the  Government;  "it is 
possible  on  that  site  but  you  have  to  meet  A,  Band  C  levels 
of  objective  and  you  work  out  exactly  how  you  are  going  to 
do  it  and  how  much  it is  going  to  cost";  and  they  did,  and 
they  came  back  and  said,  "We  are  not  very  attracted  to 
that".  The  company  was  not  very  attracted  because  the  costs 
associated  with  the  project  were  quite  high  and  they  came 
back  and  said,  "We  still  want  to  go  down  a  chloride  route 
and  we  still find  it attractive  to  have  markets  out  there 
but  we  really can't  afford  to  have  that  effluent  control 
what  do  we  do?".  There  was  the  iterative  process  that  went 
on  which  said  if  you  need  to  generate  more  capital,  more 
income  to  pay  for  your  capital,  the  appropriate  way  may  well 
be  to  have  a  large  plant  but  you  can  not  do  it at  that  site 
because  of  the  environmental  constraints.  An  alternative 
location  may  be  available  where  you  do  not  have  the  same 
constraints,  i. e.  the  assimilative  capacity is  different  and 
whel'e  the  condi tions  that  were  recommended  by  the  EPA"  may  be 
accomplished.  Now,  again  we  have  the  priviledge  of  looking 
at  the  individual  pr'oject,  and  again  by  moving  to  a  place 
that  has  a  separate,  a  different  assimilative  capacity 
because  it does  not  have  people  living  around it  (and  that 
is  primarily  the  impact  there)  it  was  possible  to  use  the 
technique  that  we  have  here  to  come  up  with  a  proposal  which 
the  EPA  recommended  as  being  environmentally acceptable.  It 
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is  my  belief  that  the  company  and  the  state  equally  find 
this  proposal  aLtractive  from  their  points  of  view,  and  they 
will  mut.ually  meet  their  own  objectives.  What·  the  EPA  has 
said,  is  that  if  the  project  goes  to  this  place  with  a 
different  assimilative  capacity,  it  will  not  be  necessary  to 
spend  as  much  money  proportionally  on  environmental 
management;  the  assimilative  capacity  will  be  different,  the 
plant  can  be  larger  and  therefore  the  company  can  generate 
more  money  to  pay  for  it.  I  guess  it has  an  attraction  to 
the  state  because  it  meanS  more  jobs,  more  r'evenue  generated 
and  of  course  the  environments  are  protected. 
Now  it 
which  I 
the  EPA 
is  my  belief  that  we  are  now  sitting  on  a  project 
think  the  society finds  attractive,  which  certainly 
recommended  as  environmentally  acceptable,  I  believe 
the  Government  finds  it attractive  and  I  believe  the  company 
does  too. 
I  have  some  criticisms  of 
involved  with  and  one  of  those 
the  process  that 
is  that  it  can 
slow  sometimes.  It  would  be  much  quicker  to  say, 
we  have  been 
be  awfully 
"look  thet'e 
are  the  rules,  take  it or  leave  it! ".  Certainly,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  resources  in  my  department  it  would  be  much 
easier  to  say,  "ther'e  are  the  rules,  we  are  gOing  to  control 
you  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  emissions  that 
and  some  other  standards  that  we  put  on 
particular  proposal  has  been  a  slower  one;  I  am 
however,  that  the  disadvantages  do  not 









The  proposal 
wastewater  be 
t ha  t  we 
managed 
have  before 
by  pumping  it 
us  now  is 
to  the  ocean. 
that  the 
You  will 
recall  in  our  recommendations  we  suggested  a  couple  of  ways 
we  would  find  acceptable;  certainly on  a  departmental  basis, 
but  there  has  not  been  a  legal  agreement  signed  on  this,  I 
don't  believe.  That  is  a  proposal  that  the  EPA  .Iould  find 
acceptable,  it  really is  about  a  third  the  concentration  of 
seawater  anyway  that  is  being  pumped  and  we  have  ongoing 
discussions  with  the  company  now  about  the  method  of  getting 
that  water  to  the  ocean  and  having  a  mlnimum  impact.  This 
ranges  from  pipelines  which  are  buried  or  not  buried  as 
through  the  environment  to  get  there  and  once  it  has  got  to 
the  ocean  is  it  better  to  have  a  pipelines  that  protrudes 
out  into  the  ocean,  or  is  it better  In  fact  to  inject  it 
into  the  soil  right  where  the  ocean  meets  the  land?,  and 
that  may  be  the  way  you  minimise  environmental  impact. 
That's  not  Lotally  finished  but  there  are  anyone  of  three 
or  four  alternatives  or  methods  which  the  EPA  would  find 
acceptable  tu  reach  its objective.  Remember  that  the  EPA's 
primary  concern  is  to  say,  "that' s  the  objective~  you  come 
-45-back  and  tel]  us  the  way  you  want  to  meet  it".  It  is  a  vet'y 
big  trap  to  fall  in  to  say,  "we  want  you  to  go  and  do  this 
in  order  to  meet  the  objective"  because  if they  go  and  do 
that  and  it  doesn't  work,  they  are  still  meeting  the 
requirements  for  the  law  and  the  state  picks  up  the  cost 
associated  with  fixing  it  up.  It  is  very  important  that  we 
do  not  tell  them  what  they  have  to  do  to  achieve,  we  tell 
them  what  to  achieve  - then  the  onus  is  on  the  proponent. 
-46-APPENDIX  II 
Interview  with  David  Parker,  Hinis,ter  for  Resources  and  Energy, 
25th  August,  1987 
Q. 
D.  P. 
How  do  you  feel  about  the  EIA  process  in  WA? 
I  think  in  general  terms  it is  very  good,  it  s,eeks  to 
be  flexible  and  as  simple  as  possible.  I  think it 
does  not  impose  rigid  legal  criteria  which  have  to  be 
met  which  can  result  in  extensive  legal  challenges.  I 
think  that  we  get  the  beHt  of  both,  making  sure  that 
projects  are  assessed  properly  and  at  the  same  time, 
avoiding  the  excessive  legal  deeds  and  extraordinary 
delays  that  take  place,  for  example  in  the  United 
states  where  there  is  a  more  legalisic  system.  Not 
only  do  you  have  the  EIS  process  but  you  have  the 
legal  process  that  almost  inevitably  seems  to  follow 
and  that  has  been  avoided  in  Western  Australia.  I 
think  another  good  aspect  of  it,  is  that  it  makes 
absolutely  clear  that  the  EPA  is  an  advisor  to 
Govet'nment  and  this  advice,  of  course,  is  very 
important  advice  and  it  needs  to  be  taken  very 
seriouslY and  it  needs  to  be  made  public  so  that  the 
public  can  see  what  the  advice  is.  But  in  the  final 
analysis  it  is  tho  Government  that  makes  the 
decision.  I  think  that  is  very  important  for  the 
democrat.ic  process,  that  the  Government  makes  the 
final  decision  rather  than  a  separate  non-accountable 
body  which  again  is  the  case  both  in  some  other 
states  of  Australia  and  other  parts  of  the  ~orld. 
Q.  From  your  point  of  view,  do  you  think  that  EIA  is 
achieving its objective?  It is  not  taking  too  long  or 
going  about  it in  a  roundabout  sort  of  way? 
D.  P.  I  think  we  could  all  complain  about  individual 
incidents  that  make  us  frustrated  and  so  on  and  I 
guess  because  of  the  nature  of  my  portfolio  I  come  up 
against  the  EIS  or  ERMP  process  more  than  most 
people.  I  wouldn't  say  that  it  i.s  absolutely  per'fect 
but  I  think  in general  terms  it isn't  long;  I  think 
that  it  has  shown  we  can  deal  with  things  quickly 
when  they  need  to  be  dealt  with  and  at  the  same  time 
it  has  done  them  thoroughly,  cooperatively  and,  in 
general  terms,  it is  a  very  positive  proce8s.  At  the 
same  time,  the  public  has  got  procedures  to  seek  the 
protection  and  the  information it  needs. 
-47-Q.  Do  you  think  the  EIA  process  is  well  meshed  wi th  the 
development  side  of  Government? 
D.  P.  Yes,  I  think that  the  way  in  which 
happen,  whereby  project  proponents, 
projects  generally 
for  example  in  my 
area,  in  the  resources  development  area,  come  to  me 
and  either  they  or  I  put  in  a  Notice  of  Intent  on 
their  behalf.  Then  the  EPA  will  examine  it and  its 
officers  will  talk it through  with  my  officers  and 
the  company,  work ,out  a  .level  of  assessment  that  they 
think  is  appropriate  and  then  require  the  company  to 
act  accordingly.  I  think  in general  terms  there  is  a 
good  meshing  and  ~  good  understanding  on  the  part  of 
the  EPA  of  the  commercial  constraints  a  lot  of  these 
companies  work  under  in  respect. of  timing. 
Q.  Do  you  think  the  EIA  is  a  hindrance  to  development  at 
all? 
D.  P.  I  think it  depends  whether  you  take  the  short  or  the 
long-term  point  of  view.  If  you  take  the  short-term 
point  of  view,  then  you  can  say  ..  yes,  it is"  because 
obviously  if  you  could  just  go  ahead  and  bui Id 
anything  you  wanted  to,  then it  would  be  much  easier 
than  if  you  have  to  go  through  these  sorts  of 
processes.' But  I  think  long-term it  is  in  fact  an 
assistance  for  two  reasons:  The  first  is  that  almost 
any  resource  development  project  you  care  to  talk 
about  is  dealing  with  limited  resources  (limited  as 
to  things  like  ore  bodies  or  energy  or  land 
availability  or  things  lIke  that)  and  so  you  need  to 
have  an  overall  community  benefit  to  look  at it  from 
that  point  of  view.  Secondly,  I  think  that  the  public 
might,  for  a  little  while,  accept  development 
projects  going  ahead  without  consideration  of  the 
environmental  impact  but  sooner  or  later  they  develop 
a.  public  resistance  to  that  and  I  actually  think  that 
it  is  in  the  interest  of  developers,  long-term,  to 
make  sure  that  their  projects  are  environmentally 
acceptable  and  go  through  the  process  so  that  in  the 
long  term  the  public  accept  those  sorts  of  things.  So 
I  think  that  although  you  will  meet  developers  who 
say  there  shouldn't  be  an  environmental  impact 
process  over  short  term  developments,  I  think  you 
will  find  most  would  agree  for  long-term  developments 
that it may  be  in their  interests. 
-4S-Q.  John  Bailey  and  Peter  Newman  both  are  strong 
supporters  of  the  idea  that  EIA  done  properly, 
benefits  all  parties  concerned.  To  what  extent  do  you 
agree  or  disagree  with  this? 
Well,  the  last  few  comments  I  have  made  indicate  that 
I  agree  with  it.  Again,  I  think it  depends  very  much 
as  to  what  you  are  talking  about.  There  are  some 
people  who  say  that  anything  that  has  any  impact  on 
the  environment  at  all  is  to  be  deplored  but  if  you 
say  that,  and  if  you  agree  with  that,  then  of  course 
it  must  be  deleterious  to  development  as  well  as,  I 
believe,  not  very  beneficial  to  the  environment.  But 
if  what  you  say  is  you  are  managing  risks,  you  are 
dealing  with  competing  land  uses,  you  are  dealing 
with  making  priority decisions  which  is  really  what 
it amounts  to  most  of  the  time,  then  I  think it is  of 
great  benefit  to all  parties. 
Q.  Is  the  SCM  outcome  acceptable  to  you? 
D.  P.  .Oh  yes,  not  only acceptable  but  fantastic!  I  regard 
it  as  one  of  the  major  achievements  of  the  Government 
and  of  myself  as  Minister  for  Resources  Development 
from  both  a  developmental  and  an  environmental  point 
of  view.  If  you  look,  starting  from  the  environmental 
point  of  view,  we  have  a  project  which  has  been 
operating  for  25  years  in  a  location  which  if it  was 
ever  acceptable,  and·  I  doubt  whether  it  ever  was, 
certainly  it  was  not  acceptable  in  today's  day  and 
age.  You  had  substantial  degradation  in  rare  and 
incl'easingly  in  demand  for  other  uses,  sand  dune 
country  and  visual  degradation  in  terms  of  the 
pipeline  across  the  Leschenault  Inlet.  You  had 
substantial  emissions,  both  air  and  water-borne,  and 
you  were  producing  based  on  outmoded  and 
noncompetitive  technology.  We  have  now  changed  all  of 
that  to  a  plant  which  has  virtually  no  emissions  at 
all  and  certainly  no  pollutant  emissions  by  air, 
almost  no  water-borne  emissions,  a  high  tech 
industry,  fully  competitive  and  we  will  be  able  to 
stop  the  degradation  in  the  sand  dunes,  remove  the 
pipeline  and  remove  the  emissions  that  are  upsetting 
the  people  at  Australind.  So  from  the  environmental 
point  of  view,  I  think,  that  it is  excellent. 
From  a  developmental  point  of  view  we  have  got, 
instead  of  upgrading  our  levels  to  the  tune  of  36,000 
tpa,  the  product  will  be  going  out  at  70,000  tpa  so 
-49-we  have  doubled  our  output  which  is  much  more  than 
doubling  the  value  added  which  comes  to  Western 
Australia.  we  have  got  a  highly  competitive 
international  market,  probably  the  most  competitive 
and  one  of  the  biggest  in  the  world  able  to  operate 
freely  in  a  good  environment,  aftd  we  are  taking 
advantage  of  market  opportunities  and  showing  the 
world  that  we  can  do  it very  quickly,  given  that  a 
lot  of  these  similar  sorts  of  plants,  even  in 
countries  which  are  pro-development  like  Taiwan, 
Singapore  and  Korea,  have  faced  major  holdups.  I 
think  this  is  a  major  benefit  to  the  State. 
Q.  One  of  the  criticisms  of  the  EIA  process  is  that it 
is  too  slow.  Have  you  any  suggest.ions  how  it  could 
have  been  done  quicker? 
D.  P.  Two  points.  Firstly,  there  is  an  inevitable  slowness 
if  you  involve  the  public  and  I  think  you  just  have 
to  say  that's  one  of  the  costs  of  a  democratic 
society.  You  do  have  to  have  some  degree  of  public 
involvement,  to  what  degree  that  should  be  and 
whether  there  should  be  all  sorts  of  other  legal 
rights  as  there  are  in  America 1  because  of  course 
then  you  make  it  very  slow.  Projects  do  not  get 
approved  for  ten  years  in  America  because  of  the 
process  that  they  have.  Here  that  (public 
involvement)  tends  to  slow it down.  However,  I  think 
the  extent  to  which  there  is  knowledge  of  the 
operation  and  knowledge  of  the  environment  obviously 
speeds  the  process  up.  One  of  the  things  we  were  able 
to  do  at  Kemerton  was,  although  the  environmental 
process  for  the  new  plant  at  Australind  had  taken  a 
long  time,  because  of  the  knowledge  we  acquired  about 
it  we  were  able  to  make  quick  decisions  about 
Kemerton.  In  the  same  way,  because  we  had  done  a  lot 
of  study  about  Kemerton  for  the  aluminium  smelter,  we 
were  able  to  use  that  knowledge  to  make  a  quick 
decision  at  Kemerton  and  marry  the  two  together. 
Knowledge  is  the  thing  that  results  in  speed  and 
whether  that  is  because  of  greater  cooperation 
between  industry  and  Government  and  in  the  different 
Government  departments  involved  in  the  environmental 
process.  I  think  those  essential  things  would  speed 
things  up,  together  with  the  political  will  to  do it, 
and  I  think  on  this  occasion,  certainly in  relation 
to  the  Kcmerton  operation,  that  the  political  will 
-50-Q. 
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was  there  to  do  it  very  speedily  both  from  myself  and 
Barry  Hodge.  Nobody  could  complain  that  the  Kemerton 
proposal  took  any  length  of  time. 
Do  you  think it  could  have  been  done  any  better  way? 
I  (lon't  think  the  Kemerton  si te  coul d  have  been  done 
in  any  better  way,  but  in  looking  at  the  Australind 
ERMP  there  was  certainly  a  lack  of  information 
through  to  the  public  and  I  think  the  chemical 
industry in  general  has  well  and  truly  fallen  down  in 
explaining  to  the  public  what  it  is  all  about.  There 
is  a  lot  of  fear;  fear  of  the  unknown,  in  many  cases 
quite  irrational  and  wrong  fears  but  fears 
never·theless,  and  quite  generally  ones  about  living 
.near  a  chemical  plant  and  what  that  means.  Things 
like  Bophal  have  all  contributed  to  that  fear  and  I 
think  if  we  had  been  able  to  address  that  earlier  on 
in  the  piece,  we  probably  would  have  had  a  different 
social  and  political  environment.  Again,  I  think 
there  is  no  substantial  error  other  than  that  but 
obviously  as  it  turned  out  the  company  wanted  Lo 
build  on  a  particular site.  They  were  not  at  first 
prepared  to  look at  a  different  site  and  it  was  not 
until  they  did  become  prepared  to  look  at  a  different 
site  that  we  were  able  to  give  a  satisfactory 
solution. 
Q.  Is  there  anything  else  relevant  that  you  would  like 
to  say  about  the  project? 
D.  P.  Of  all  the  sorts  of  similar  things  around  the  world, 
it is  one  of  the  great  environmental  success  stories 
and  it  is  a  great  example  of  how  when  you  have  got, 
let's  say.  "the  political  will  and  you  have  got 
organisations  that  know  each  other  and  work  together 
like  ourselves,  the  mining  resolution  centre  of  the 
Government  and  the  environmental  protection  centre 
all  can  win  the  confidence  of  the  private  sector 
company.  We  have  also  been  able  to  do  what  is  very 
good  for  the  State  and  turn  a  community  which  was 
very  hostile  to  a  development  around  to  one  that  is 
now  very  supportive  of  it.  I  think  that  it is  really 
a  major  achievement. 
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APPENDI X  I II 
Interview with 
9th  September, 
Barry  Hodge, 
1987 
Minister  for  the  Envi ronment 
Q,  How  do  .\'OU  feel  about  the  EIA  process  in  fiA? 
B.  H. 
Q. 
B.  H. 
fiell  its  early  days  yet  since  the  changes  were 
introduced.  I  take  it yoU  are  referring  to  the  new 
procedures  that  we  brought  into  operation  on  20th 
February  this  year?  My  initial feeling is  that  they 
are  working  very  well  indeed.  They  have  generated  a 
lot  of  extra  work,  particularly for  officers  in  the 
EPA  and  for  myself  but  never-the-less  I  think  they 
are  a  great  improvement  on  the  previous  informal 
approach  that  was  taken  and  I  am  very  pleased  so  far. 
What 
do  yOU  think  of  your  power  in  DiVision  2,  Part 
IV  of  the  new  EnVironmental  Protection  Act? 
Well,  I  think  the  whOle  new  act  is  pretty  good  seeing 
I  had  a  large  part  in  writing it.  I  think  that  the 
crux  of  it  is  in  the  assessment  procedure  and  we 
deliberately framed  the  act  So  as  to  rectify  the 
en'or  in  the  previous  legislation.  That  is,  the 
Minister  for  the  EnVironment  was  Virtually  a 
ceremonial  Position.  In  the  past  the  Minister  had 
Virtually  no  power  or  role  whatsoever  and  apart  from 
that,  more  importantly,  the  EPA  had  no  mechanism  to 
ensure  that  any  conditions  or  recommendations  made 
were  abided  by.  The  company  was  free  to  do  as  it 
chose;  it did  not  have  to  take  any  notice  of  the 
Minister  for  the  EnVironment  or  the  EPA.  Of  course 
that  that  has  been  a  fundamental  change  long  overdue 
and  I  think  that it is  absolutely fundamental  to  the 
legislation.  Just  in  recent  times  I  have  been 
exercising  that  power  in  setting  conditions  on 
various  projects. 
From  your  point  of  view,  do  yoU  think  that 
process  in  WA  is  achieving its objective?  the  EIA 
B. H. 
As  I  said  in  answer  to  your  first  question,  it is 
very  early days  because  it  has  only  been  in  operation 
since  February  this  year.  But  at  this  early  stage  I 
am  very  optimistic  that  its  working  well  and  it  will 
-52-achieve  what  we  set  out  to  achieve.  As  I  say,  I  think 
that  it is  a  bit  early to  make  any  rash  statement~ 
but  I  think  that  it is  going  well. 
Q.  How  about  prior  to  the  new  act  - do  you  think  that  it 
was  achieving its objective  then? 
B. H. 
Q. 
B.  H. 
Q. 
I  think 
the  lack 
that  the  EPA  did  a  stirling  job  considering 
of  power  they  had  but  I  think  there  was  a 
real  need  for  that  position  to  be  legitimised  and  put 
into  statute.  The  EPA  were  using  just  moral 
persuasion  in  the  past  to  try  and  persuade  companies 
to  abide  by  the  conditions  that  they  were  setting. 
Now,  of  course,  it is  really  a  matter  of  the  law  and 
these  companieH  must  be  subject  to  assessment  and 
then  must  abide  by  the  conditions  that  the  Minister 
sets.  I  think  that  is  a  vast  improvement  so  I  think 
we  owe  the  EPA  a  debt  for  struggling  on  over  the 
years  when  it  did  not  really  have  the  statutory 
power.  It  achieved  quite  a  lot  and  probably  a  number 
of  projects  proceded  on  a  much  better  basis  than  if 
the  EPA  had  not  been  there.  Nevertheless,  I  do  not 
think  there  is  any  substitute  for  having  the  real 
statutory  power. 
Do  you  think  that  EIA  is  a  hindrance  to  development? 
Oh  yes,  I  suppose,  to  be  honest  you  have  to  say  that 
any  planning,  environmental,  health  checks  or  local 
government  check;  or  anything  can  be  a  hindrance  to 
development.  I  think  that  it is  a  justifiable  and 
legitimate  hindrance  but  obviously  some  developers 
would  argue  that  we  should  not  have  any  sort  of 
planning  hindrance  or  environmental  hindrance  or 
anything  else  and  of  course  I  would  not  agree  with 
that.  So,  I  guess  while  in  the  strict  technical 
sense,  yes,  it  does  delay  and  probably  hinder  some 
entrepreneurs  and  some  developers,  nevertheless  I 
think  that  is  a  legitimate  function  and  I  do  not  make 
any  apologies  for  it.  I  do  not  think  there  is  evel' 
any  unnecessary  or  protracted  hindrance  by  the 
environmental  process. 
John  Bajley  and  Peter  Newman 
supporters  of  the  idea  that 
benefits  all  parties  concerned. 
agree  or  disagree. 
.. 5 3-
are  both  strong 
EIA  done  properly, 
To  what  extent  do  you B.  H. 
Q. 
B.  H. 
Well,  I  am  not  sure  the  developers;  the  proponents; 
would  necessarily  agree  with  that.  I  think  probably 
many  of  them  would  debate  that  issue  with  you  and 
would  not  agree  that  it is  an  assistance  to  them. 
Some  of  the  more  enlightened  and  progressive  ones 
would  agree  with  you  and  say  they  get  a  lot  of 
benefit  out  of  this  process.  I  have  one  developer  in 
mind  at  the  moment  who  is  threatening  to  cancel  an 
entire  project  because  the  EPA  has  insisted  on 
subjecting  his  project  to  an  assessment  procedure.  He 
is  demanding  an  appointment  with  me  and  is  going  to 
go  to  the  media  and  is  threatening  to  cancel  his 
whole  project. 
different  ways. 
So,  certain  developers 
Is  the  SCM  outcome  acceptable  to  yoU? 
see  it in 
Yes,  Well,  we  are  still,  in  fact,  having  some 
negotiations  right  at  the  moment  with  SCM  tying  up  a 
few  loose  ends  on  the  project  and  I  can't  go  into 
those  because  they  are  confidential.  Yes,  I  am  happy 
with  the  way  the  SCM  project,  in  particular,  has 
developed. 
Q.  One  of  the  criticsms  of  the  EIA  process  is  that  it 
is  too  slow.  In  light  of  the  SCM  situation  do  you 
have  any  suggestions  on  how  it  could  have  been  done 
any  faster  or  perhaps  any  better? 
B.  H.  Well,  I  haven't  heard  the  'too  slow'  criticism 
levelled  at  the  SCM  project.  The  criticism  I  have  had 
is  the  opposite.  I  directed  the  EPA  to  report  to  me 
by  a  certain date  on  the  proposal  that  the  plant  be 
established  at  Kemerton  rather  than  Australind.  I 
directed  the  EPA  to  report  within  a  specific  time 
limit;  it  was  the  first  time  that  part  of  the  act  has 
been  used;  and  there  was  a  little  bit  of  criticism 
from  the  conservation  movement  to  the  Government  for 
in  fact  doing  that.  The  conservation  movement  were 
advocating  that  there  be  another  full  length  public 
procedure  on  the  assessment  of  the  Kemerton  site.  So 
I  haven't  heard  the  accusation  that  we  have  been  too 
slow  or  that  we  have  unnecessarily  delayed  the 
assessment  of 
some  developers 
SCM.  But  certainly,  as  I  said  before, 
and  some  local  authorities  from 
time-to-time  do  complain  that  the  assessment 
procedures  delay  and  bog  down  projects  and  that 
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are  at  risk  of  having  those  financial  arrangements 
collapse  as  backers  withdraw  or  interest  rates  alter 
because  of  lengthy  delays.  Now,  I  deny  that  there  are 
any  lengthy  delays  and  always  ask  those  people  who 
make  that  accusation  to  represent  the  evidence  to 
me  and  I  will  personally  investigate  it.  If  there 
have  been  undue  delays  then  I  will  take  some  action. 
Each  time  I  ask  people  to  provide  specific  examples 
of  undue  delays,  the  evidence  never  seems  to  come 
forward.  I  do  have  the  power  under  the  Environmental 
Protection  Act  to  direct  the  Authority  to  report  to 
me  by  a  certain date  so if  I  feel  they  have  been 
tardy  on  a  particular  matter  then  I  can  direct  them 
to  report  by  a  certain  date.  I  do  have  the  power  to 
rectify that  problem. 
Q.  I  am  aware  that  the  assessment  of  the  Kemerton 
proposal  was  comparitively  rapid.  What  I  was  hinting 
at  in  the  question  was  the  fact  that  the  process  has 
been  going  on  for  some  15  years  or  so;  since  1970,  I 
suppose,  when  alternatives  to  the  waste  disposal 
technique  on  the  dunes  were  first  loo~ed at  and  it 
seems  to  have  been  very  slow  since  then. 
B.  H.  I  do  not  think  that it is  fair  to  refer  to  that  as 
the  EIA  procedure.  We  have  had  new  procedures  since 
February  this  year.  Prior  to  that  there  was  an 
informal  arrangement  under  the  old  Environmental 
Protection  Act.  The  assessment  procedures  only  come 
into  play  when  a  new  project  is  put  forward  and 
Laporte  as  it  was  then  was  not  a  new  project  so  it 
was  not  formally  put  forward  as  a  new  project  to  be 
assessed.  But  if  you  are  referring  to  the  general 
environmental.  problem  down  there  of  dumping  the 
effluent  into  the  sand  dunes;  that  is  a  problem  we 
have  had  for  years  which  we  inherited  from  the 
previous  government.  There  was  a  deliberate  policy 
that  was  embarked  upon  by  the  Court  Government  and  we 
were  only  in  office  for  a  brief  period  before  we 
tackled  the  problem  and  have  virtually  come  up  with  a 
resolution  to  it.  So  I  think  there  can  not  be  much 
criticism  of  this  Government  in  respect  to  that 
because  we  tackled it  very  early  in  the  piece  and  to 
the  credit  of  David  Parker,  he  managed  to  persuade 
that  company  to  take  action  that  is  going  to  bring 
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with  the  progress  we  have  made  in  respect  to  that. 
Q.  Is  there  anything  else  that  you  would  like  to  say 
about  the  SCM  project? 
B.H.  UILimatley  I  would  like  to  see  that  plunt  removed 
entirely  from  the  Australind  site  and  the  bulk  of 
that  area  used  for  residential  development.  That  is 
what  I  will  continue  to  work  for.  I  think  that  is  an 
inappropriate  location  for  a  large  chemical  plant  and 
I  think  ultimately  we  have  to  persuade  that  company 
to  remove  its  whole  operation  and  clean  up  the  are~ 
and  to  tUrn  as  much  as  possible  over  to  residential 
development.  That  is  my  long  term objective. 
-56-APPENDI X  I V 
Interview  with  John  Leach,  General  Manager  of  SCM  Chemicals 
Limi ted,  2nd  October,  1987 
Q.  How  do  you  feel  about  the  Environmental  Protection 
Authori ty' s  assessment  of  the  ERMP  Stage  II  and 
subsequent  NOI?  I  am  not  talking  about  the  EPA's 
conclusion  and  recommendations  but  about  the 
environmental  impact  assessment  process.  For  example, 
was  the  process  too  slow? 
J. L.  1 . 
2. 
3. 
The  process  can  take  too  long.  We  could 
demonstrate  the  speedier  processing  of  approvals 
for  more  hazardous  plants  in  more  built  up 
locations  through  the  UK  system.  In  the  United 
States  it  would  be  reasonable  to  expect  that  we 
would  have  obtained  approval  and  built  the  plant 
in  the  time  it  has  taken  to  obtain  approval  in 
Western  Australia.  For  organizations  with 
multiple  choice  locations  and  facing  particular 
market  opportunity  window~,  resource  allocation 
will  be  channelled  to  those  locations  with 
faster  approval  processes,  other  factors  being 
held  reasonably  constant.  Often  these  other 
locations  have  the  added  advantages  of  lower 
factor  prices  of  inputers,  thus  putting  Hestern 
Australia  at  a  significant  disadvantage. 
The  process  has  an  unfair  bias  towards 
and  its  Minister.  For  example: 
the  EPA 
(a)  Time  constraints  are  placed  upon  all  parties 
except  the  time  the  Minister  can  have  to 
determine  appeals  and  the  time  the  EPA  has 
to  consider  and  report  on  the  proposals. 
(b)  The  appeals  procedure  is  based  on  the  same 
people  who  have  made  the  original 
recommendations.  Natural  justice  will  always 
be  questionable  under  such  an  arrangement. 
The  EPA  have  a  lack  of  expertise  in  assessing 
some  of  lhe  aspects  of  projects, 





This  requires  considerable  technical  knowledge 
and  experience  in  handling  data.  It  is  not 
possible  to  assess  risk  by  the  simplistic 
measurement  of  the  exposure  of  individuals.  The 
EPA  are  in 
significant 
danger 
risk  if 
of  sanctioning  projects  of 
they  do  not  acquire 
expertise  in  the  area  of  project  assessment. 
The  system  calls  for  more 
information  in  order  that 
and  more  detailed 
EPA  can  make  an 
assessment.  The  type  of  information  required  is 
not  normally  available  until  a  project  is  well 
down  the  design  track. 
The  detail  of  information  being  requested  is  I 
right  and  proper  for  full  project  assessment  but 
NOT  at  the  initial  stage  of  a  project. 
It  is  likely that  many  proponents  will  not  spend 
the  money  to  provide  detail  in  the  depth 
required  simply  for  an  ERMP  to  have  a  project 
rejected  on  non-objective  grounds. 
The  EPA  seem  to  be  attempting  to 
to  all  men.  Satisfy  proponents, 
politicians  and  satisfy the  public. 
be  all  things 
satisfy  the 
This  is  not 
possible  and  as  a  consequence  they  lose  some  of 
their  objectivity. 
The  system is  biased  against  the  proponent  in 
that  once  a  negative  recommendation  is  published 
it  is  unlikely  that  Government  or  others  will 
fight  for  a  change. 
7.  The  concept  of  an  initial  environmental  review 
undertaken  quickly  and  involving all  parties  is 
good,  but  the  present  system  is  getting  too 
detailed  and  is  rapidly  becoming  a  full  project 
assessment  and  licencing  system  at  the 
first  stage.  There  needs  to  be  interaction 
between  the  proponent  and  the  relevant  decision 
making  authorities  to  develop  a  document  which 
addresses  the  main  issues. 
probably  trying  to  use  an 
Different  people  are 
ERMP  for  different 
purposes,  not  all  of  which  are  compatible  with  a 
document  which  in effect  is  a  planning  do~ument 
and  not  detailed  proposals. Q.  Do  you  think  the  requirement  to  undergo  environmental 
assessment  helped  or  hindered  your  tompany  to  achieve 
your  objective? 
J. L.  1 . 
2. 
The  system  as 
without  doubt 
2  years  to 
currently  being  administered  has 
hindered  the  project.  It  has  taken 
get  initial  approval.  The  plant 
should  have  been  in  operation  now. 
I  believe  that  most 
would  voluntarily 
compani as, 
do  all  the> 
ours  included, 
things  that  are 
necessary  for  the  ERMP  and  satisfied  itself  of 
the  projects  environmental  impacts  without  the 
long  bureaucratic  system  we  operate.  For 
example: 
(a)  We  did  our  own  risk analysis  without  the 
EPA's  requirement. 
(bl  We  would  only  discharge  clean  water  to  the 
Collie. 
I  can  think  of  only  one  thing  that  the  system 
has  contributed  to  the  project  - allowing  ocean 
discharge  instead  of  Wellesley  River. 
Such  lengthy  procedul'es  are  a  dl'ain  on  company's 
resources  of  manpower  and  finances. 
Q,  Given  that  the  ERMP  stage  II  was  available  for  public 
review  whereas  the  NOI  received  only  limited  public 
exposure,  what  are  your  views  on  the  involvement  of 
the  public,  particularly  the  local  community?  For 
example,  do  you  believe  that  public  involvement  has 
led  to  a  greater  community  acceptance  of  your 
company's  proposals? 
J. L.  No.  I  believe  community  involvement  on  the  scale  seen 
in  this  area  has  led  to  a  lot  of  unnecessary 
misunderstanding  and  emotion.  The  issues  of  risk  and 
community  concern  brought  forward  by  many  people  were 
masks  Lo  give  face  validity to  particular  individual 
interests,  such  as  land  sub-division  potential. 
Evidence  which  was  available  to  the  EPA  Department 
officers,  and  which  would  have  reduced  community 
concern,  was  not  released  into  the  publi c  domai n. 




of  the 
have  reduced  the  exagge~ated 
hazards  associated  with  the 
The  EPA  appears  prepared  to  listen  and 
recommendations  on  the  smallest  of  public 
This  gives  a  biased  weighting  to  the 
generally  minority  groups. 
publish 
opi ni ons. 
view  of 
In  politics  of  socjal  choice  it  is  difficult  to 
distill  into  a  group  purpose  the  divergent  private 
objectives  of  the  community.  Consensus  will  not 
necessarily emerge  from  conflict,  as  differences  will 
not  always  be  resolvable  unless  there  is  a  firm  set 
of  rules  for  their  resolution.  The  current  review 
process  does  not  provide  these  rules. 
Q.  Can  you  suggest  any  ways  in  which  the  process  could 
have  been  improved? 
J. L.  1 .  There  should  be  more  discussion  between  the  EPA 












2.  The  EPA  should  concern  itself with  an  initial, 
quick,  OBJECTIVE  technical  assessment  of  a 
project.  It should  not  involve  itself  in  the 
3. 
public  ( poli ti  call  or  economic  benefits  or 
project.  It  should  not  disadvantages  of  a 
address  itself  to  passing  opinions  based  upon 
non  technical  criteria. 
Technical,  objective,  assessments  should  then  be 
argued  with  Government,  public  and  proponents  on 
the  economic  benefits  and  environmental 
of  a  project. 
impacts 
The  EPA  is 
Government 
deci si  ons. 
or 
The  EPA  must 
currently  usurping  the  role  of  the 
politicians  in  making  project 
acquire  technical  competence  for 
its  evaluation  division. 
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5. 
The  appeals  procedure  must  be 
more  objecti ve. 
made  fairer  and 
If  quick, 
made  of  a 
objective 
project 
technical  assessments  are 
thi  s  will  speed  up  the 
process. 
shortened. 
It  is  imperative  that  the  system  is 
It  should  be  the  objective  to  have  an 
EPA  assessment,  even  on  a  major  project, 
completed  in  6  months 
6.  The  terms  of  reference  for  the  EPA  need  refining 
so  that  they  stop  trying  to  be  all  things  to  all 
men  and  take  on  the  role  of  objective  technical 
environmental  assessors. 
The  future  economic  well  being  and  wealth  generation 
of  the  State  will  be  significantly impaired  unless 
changes  are  made.  The  inordinate  delays,  the  lack  of 
objectivity in  assessment  and  the  biased  appeals 
procedure  will  lead  to  a  refusal  by  developers  to  put 
forward  projects  in  this  State. 
It  should  be  remembered  that  in  these  days 
deregulated 
the  wot'ld 
finance,  investors  have  many  places 




could  soon  become  a  "no  go"  area  unless  significant 
improvements  are  made  to  the  current  system. 
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